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This paper is an examination of the Romanian economy.
It begins with a basic description of socialist economies,
outlining characteristics and procedures common to many so-
cialist economies. For purpose of comparison, the next sec-
tion cites recent economic information on Eastern European
socialist countries other than Romania.
The section on Romania compares its economy to the so-
cialist model; describes its formal structure, composition,
and distribution; and identifies trade relations. It traces
the development of the economy through the seven five-year
plans from 1951-1985. It then highlights economic events
that reflect dissent in Romania and economic reform programs.
Useful definitions, tabular examples of Romanian trade,
graphic displays of economic features, and the text of the
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The Warsaw Pact countries of Eastern Europe— Bulgaria,
Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, Poland, and Romania--
have figured prominently in the history of the twentieth
century. Events involving one or more of these countries
have twice erupted into world wars. In both instances,
strong nationalistic sentiments were key elements, providing
both the fuel and the spark for massive upheaval.
In the years since World War II, purely nationalistic
fervor which led to bitter inter-nation rivalries and mili-
tary conflict between the countries appears to have waned.
Economic issues now predominate. It would be a mistake, how-
ever, to presume that the potential for major disruption in
the area has similarly declined.
On the contrary, this potential has probably increased.
The peoples of the Eastern European bloc countries now have
a common, yet individualized, cause around which to rally--
reform of the centrally-planned economies to provide higher
standards of living. Nationalistic identities as well as
cultural and ethnic characters are evident in the different
approaches to reform in each country.
Since any reform movement in Eastern Europe is a direct
challenge to the pre-eminence of the Communist Party within
each country, it is also, either directly or indirectly, a
threat to the Soviet Union's hegemony in the region and to
the legitimacy of Communist totalitarianism in the Soviet
Union itself. This is a situation which the Soviet Union
will not tolerate. Soviet military interventions in East
Germany in 1953, in Hungary in 1956, and in Czechoslovakia
in 1968 crushed reform movements which jeopardized the ex-
isting political and economic order in these countries.
They clearly demonstrate the importance the Soviet Union
places on stable, Communist regimes in Eastern Europe and
the extreme measures it is prepared to take to preserve the
status quo in Eastern European countries.
The situation in Poland since 1979 is the most recent
example of the dilemma of Eastern European bloc countries
with regard to economic reform. The emergence of the Soli-
darity trade union, its demands for relaxation or elimina-
tion of government controls, its persistent threats of work
slowdowns or strikes, and its efforts to become involved in
the legislative functions of the government exceeded the
limits of Soviet tolerance. Fear of Soviet intervention was
probably the major factor contributing to the imposition of
martial law in Poland in December 1981 and the outlawing of
Solidarity as a legitimate, recognized voice of the workers.
While martial law and the subsequent repressive measures
against dissident activity may have reduced the imminent
danger of Soviet military action against Poland, they have
done nothing to correct the underlying causes of popular
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dissatisfaction with the economic conditions that gave rise
to the Solidarity movement.
In commenting on the events in Poland, Western media re-
ports speculate on the development of similar economic con-
ditions and socio-political turmoil in other Communist-ruled
countries of the Eastern European bloc. Romania is often
cited as the country most likely, after Poland, to be inca-
pable of meeting the current economic needs of its citizens.
In some cases, Romania has been characterized as a parasiti-
cal country, expected to renege on the repayment of its out-
standing debts to Western banks and organizations.
This is an unfair judgment. The Romanian economy demon-
strated considerable growth over the past decade, and the
Romanian record of loan repayment, until recently, was good.
It is only in the wake of developments in Poland, and in
light of shallow comparisons of the two countries--basical ly
noting that both have centrally-planned economies and there-
fore share common def 1ciencies--that Romania's ability and
willingness to meet its scheduled repayments to the West have
come into question.
This is not to say that Romania has no economic problems.
On the contrary, Romania faces serious difficulties. Its
standard of living is among the lowest in Eastern Europe;
shortages in basic necessities are acute; food lines are com-
mon. Efforts to create economic ties with the West were se-
riously affected by the worldwide recession. Export markets
that drastically declined in the late 1970's are slow to be
reestablished in the wake of the ongoing Western recovery.
Unlike other Eastern European bloc countries, Romania
cannot rely on subsidies or assistance from the Soviet Union
to offset the effects of the Western recession on its econ-
omy. In fact, Soviet actions exacerbate the problem. Roma-
nia has often deviated from or openly opposed Soviet policy
in matters of intra-bloc cooperation or foreign affairs. The
Soviet Union is now using Romania's past maverick actions as
an excuse to cut back on supplies of raw materials, particu-
larly oil that is desperately needed for continued industrial
development, or to charge full market prices for these goods.
This is in distinct contrast to Soviet policy toward other
Eastern European bloc countries.
The combination of these adverse Soviet policies, declin-
ing hard currency trade with the West, and, in particular,
rising energy costs has had disastrous effects on the Roman-
ian economy. Government promises of better living conditions
by the mid-1980's will not be fulfilled.
Romanians can, realistically, expect no positive change
in their standard of living in the immediate or foreseeable
future. In fact, conditions are more likely to worsen. As
this occurs, potential for dissent from the long-suffering
Romanian population increases.
Long accustomed to foreign dominance or exploitation, Ro-
manians have, until recently, stoically accepted government
10
demands for sacrifice in the name of economic progress. Only
isolated protests against government policies and economic
inefficiencies have occurred.
As the government's self-proclaimed target date for eco-
nomic prosperity nears, and with no improvement in living
conditions likely, Romanian intellectuals have become more
outspoken against the regime. Although there is no unified
dissent movement and no vehicle like Poland's Solidarity Un-
ion to coordinate protests, sporadic and spontaneous demon-
strations against the government have increased.
Economically motivated dissent could cause severe politi-
cal problems for the Ceausescu government. In order to sig-
nificantly improve Romanian living conditions, fundamental
structural and bureaucratic changes must occur; however, such
changes risk incurring Soviet action against Romania.
How Romania deals with its problems has serious implica-
tions for its relations with the Soviet Union, its Eastern
European neighbors, and the West. An understanding of Roma-
nia's economic development, goals, and needs could identify
opportunities to influence these relationships to the advan-
tage of the United States and our allies.
A logical point from which to develop such an understand-
ing of the Romanian economy is a description of the salient
features of centrally-planned economies and an overview of
how other Eastern European bloc countries are dealing with
common problems and reform measures.
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II. NATURE OF CENTRALLY-PLANNED ECONOMIES
Conventional Communists argue that central planning
"enables society to overcome both the anarchy of production
and the class war inherent in the capitalist mode of produc-
tion." 1 According to theory, centrally-planned production
should be more efficient than the apparently haphazard ap-
proach of capi tal i sm. In practice, though, centrally-planned
economies have a relatively poor record of "actually calcula-
ting and implementing a plan for the efficient allocation of
a nation's resources. "2 Even moderate success is not typical
of the entire system; increased efficiency in one sector is
invariably at the expense of all other sectors. In fairness,
however, centrally-planned economies do tend to work well in
backward countries with a pronounced need to "catch up" with
industrial societies, but this is true only for the particu-




Although the Soviet example serves as the model on which
all other Communist centrally-planned (or, in conventional
Communist usage, "socialist") economies are based, it is not
Michael Ellman, Socialist Planning
,
bridge University PresT^ 1979)
, p . IT^





surprising that specific applications of central planning
principles vary as widely among the Communist-ruled (or "so-
cialist") states as do those of market economics among "capi-
talist"^ states. Every country, no matter what its economic
orientation, adopts only those economic features which are
uniquely suited to its particular needs and circumstances.
It is possible, however, to identify general characteristics
of planning common to all socialist states.
The three most important elements common to Communist
centrally-planned economies are state ownership of the means
of production, national economic planning, and political dic-
tatorship. These elements are considered essential in order
to achieve maximum control of all the economic resources of
the society. The purpose of such control is the systematic
pursuit of national objectives, which include "rapid economic
growth and in particular rapid industrialization, an egalita-
rian income distribution, and the development of the armed
forces." 4
3ln the interest of brevity, throughout this study, use
of the term "socialist" reflects conventional Communist usage
for Communi st central ly-pl anned economies and Communi st-rul ed
states. It applies primarily to Warsaw Pact countries and to
other Eastern European countries which have Communist govern-
ments. It also is used to describe the principles and theo-
retical applications of central planning. It specifically
does not refer to countries which have elements of socialism
in their economies but which maintain democratic governments,
such as France and Greece. Similarly, the term "capitalist"
refers to market economies in non-Communist states.
4Ellman, p. 15.
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A. BASIC PRINCIPLES OF SOCIALIST PLANNING
The Soviet example provides the following four basic
principles, rooted in Marxist-Leninist theory, which are the
foundation of central planning in all socialist economies:
First, economic growth is a process in which both forces
of production and the relations of production are developed.
Therefore socialist planning concerns itself not only with
purely production problems, but also with such questions as
the ownership of production capability and the distribution
of income.
The Marxian definition of forces of production includes
all factors of the abstract labor process: 1) labor power
and the resulting natural science, technology, human skills
inventions, and organization; 2) the subject of labor, which
could be soil and water, raw materials or natural resources,
or products of labor such as processed ores used in creation
of other products; and 3) instruments of labor, which encom-
pass such things as workshops, canals, roads, the earth it-
self, and, the greatest productive power, the revolutionary
class. It is a description of many complex phenomena which
permits interpretation as both economic development or the
creation of a new class. The term relations of production
,
according to Marx, refers to relations between men engaged
in the productive process--the division of labor and distri-
bution of functions, lines of authority, and employment of
technology in the workpl ace--and, more importantly, property,
14
or ownership, relations, which are inevitable and independent
of the will of men. Property ownership in the Marxist sense
makes no distinction between the master to slave and the em-
ployer to employee relationships. This is the crux of Marx-
ist arguments in which the particular property form of capi-
talism is seen to prevent full development of the economic
system, human development of the working class, or both. By
this definition, production relations inevitably are in con-
flict with productive forces. 5
Second, economic growth is a unified process of produc-
tion, distribution, exchange, and consumption. Of these, the
decisive phase is production.
Third, the only source of national income is from labor
in the productive sphere. Expansion in the non-productive
sphere is possible only on the basis of growth in the produc-
tive sphere.
Fourth, under socialism, the growth phase takes place si-
multaneously in physical and money terms. Planning must be
in both physical and monetary units. °
B. SPECIFIC CHARACTERISTICS OF SOCIALIST PLANNING
In addition to the basic principles, Soviet-style plan-
ning is dominated by eight specific characteristics:
^Michael Evans, Karl Marx
,
(Bloomington , IN: Indiana
University Press, 1975), pp. 63-64.
6 Ellman, pp. 16-17.
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1. Partymi ndedness -- the plan must be a concrete ex-
pression of party policy. It must examine all problems from
a party point of view and evaluate them accordingly.
2. Directive character -- planning is never suggestive
in nature or merely a statement of desired goals. It takes
the form of instructions that are binding on all participants
in the economy.
3. One-man management -- in each economic unit, one man
has the appropriate authority to make decisions and is solely
responsible to his superiors for the execution of orders.
4. Scientific analysis -- plans do not embody subjective
decisions by one official or organization for selfish mo-
tives. They reflect careful examination and consideration of
problems that confront the entire society and are designed
with the common good in mind.
5. Balance method -- double entry bookkeeping which en-
sures that all plans are internally consistent.
6. Address principle -- for each target, there is a cor-
responding organization or agency responsible for oversight
of all functions related to achieving the stated goal.
7. Leading links -- at any given moment, the efforts of
the planners and the allocation of material and human resour-
ces are directed to achieving the planned goals in certain
priority sectors of the economy.
8. Commercial accounting -- each economic unit maintains
its own profit and loss account. The aims are to stimulate
16
and encourage efficiency and, at the same time, to prevent
waste and bureaucratization .
^
Over the past three decades, the Eastern European Commu
nist bloc countries have, to some extent, evolved economies
that are independent of the Soviet Union; however, they all
adhere to these characteristics as theoretical central fea-
tures of the socialist economy.
C. STRUCTURES AND PROCEDURES IN CENTRAL PLANNING
In keeping with the Soviet model, all centrally-planned
economies conform to certain structures and procedures. As
a starting point, each has a central planning authority, usu-
ally known as the State Planning Commission (SPC). This body
is responsible for five specific tasks:
1. determination of the criteria of economic cal-
culation underlying planning decisions;
2. determination and quantification of the targets
to be reached in the planned period;
3. co-ordination of the targets to ensure the in-
ternal consistency of the plan;
4. determination of appropriate methods to ensure
plan fulfillment; and
5. current revision of targets according to chang-
ing conditions. 8
7 Ellman, pp. 17-19.
8M. Pohorile (ed.), E k o n o m 1 a p o 1 i ty c z n a s ocjal i z m
u
(The
Political Economy of Socialism), Warsaw, PWE, 1968, p. 362,
cited by J(ozef) Wilczynski, The Economics of Socialism
,
(Boston: George Allen and Unwin, 1982), pp. 15-16.
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The end product of the State Planning Commission's deli-
berations is the current output plan. This document embodies
a variety of information and presupposes broad as well as in-
depth knowledge on the part of the SPC. It specifies target
production levels for the commodities deemed to be the most
important to fulfilling planned goals. The number and type
of priority commodities addressed in the plan vary signifi-
cantly among the socialist countries. The Soviet Union's
current output plan contains the largest number of priority
commodities, 1000.9 Czechoslovakia's plan addresses only 200
commodities; Bulgaria's, 120; and East Germany's, the fewest,
80.^0 Romania's current output plan contains 200 priority
commodi ties . ^
To develop the current output plan, the State Planning
Commission begins with a statistical analysis of the previous
year. It then studies developments in the first six months
of the current year and forecasts what will occur in the next
six months. Using these data and keeping the basic objec-
tives of the Council of Ministers in mind, the SPC then con-
structs central f igures--tentati ve, aggregate output targets
9Wayne A. Leeman, Centralized and Decentralized Economic
Systems, (Chicago: Rand McNally College Publishing Company,
1977), p. 22.
10Wilczynski, p. 17.
^Andreas C. Tsantis and Roy Pepper, Romania: The Indus -
trialization of an Agrarian Economy under Socialist Planning
,
(Washington, D.C.: The World Bank, 1979), p. 43.
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for the most important commodity groups as well as a list of
the major investment targets— for the following year.^2
Subordinate economic organizations—from highest to low-
est, ministries, submini stries , and enterpri ses--use the con-
trol figures as a guide and project potential outputs and
required inputs to achieve them based on their knowledge and
experience. Each level aggregates the input needs from its
subordinate organizations and submits these figures to the
next higher level. Each ministry submits the compiled data
to the State Planning Commission. When the SPC receives the
aggregate information, it must balance the supply and demand
for each of the commodities.
There are two common methods for balancing supply and de-
mand requirements at the SPC level. The first, material bal-
ances for each commodity, is a yearly statement in physical
terms of the total demand for and the total supply of a pro-
duct. A typical example would consider all possible sources
of a product (e.g., production capability, imports, and exis-
ting stocks at suppliers at the beginning of the period) and
all required distribution for the product (e.g., production-
operation needs including production inputs and maintenance;
construction; market fund; exports; increases in state re-
serves for national disasters; increases in Council of Minis-
ters reserves for distribution during the year to cover any
12|_eeman, p. 22.
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supply failures; and stocks at suppliers at the end of the
period. ) * 3
This method is complex and cumbersome and requires sev-
eral iterations to ensure internal consistency of output tar-
get figures. It also focuses on each commodity individually,
in isolation from all others. Vital relationships among com-
modities may be overlooked in the planning process. Because
of these significant shortcomings, use of the material bal-
ances approach to planning has declined. The second method,
inter-branch balances, has become the preferred approach in
most socialist countries.
Inter-branch balances is a highly sophisticated method
that "can best be described as input-output analysis. It
consists in working out a matrix flow which looks like a
chessboard. It provides a synthetic and lucid picture of
processes directed at production and distribution."^
The value of the inter-branch balances system is that it
represents the entire economy in tabular form. It depicts
the interrelationships among all the branches, thereby per-
mitting cross-referencing in seemingly unrelated areas of the
economy. An important advantage of this method is that it
^Herbert S. Levine, "The Centralized Planning of Supply
in Soviet Industry," Comparisons of the United States and
Soviet Economies (Joint Economic Commi ttee, Congress of the
United States, 86th Congress, First Session, 1959), pp. 162-
163, cited in Leeman, p. 23.
14Wilczynski, p. 18.
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often permits identification of input needs that would not be
considered or recognized using other methods of analysis. 15
After the State Planning Commission balances the supply
and demand for each of the centrally-planned commodities, it
submits the plan to the Council of Ministers. The Council of
Ministers may approve the plan as submitted, or it may direct
changes to target outputs, which then require rebalancing of
the plan.
Once the plan is approved by the Council of Ministers,
the final step in the process is for the State Planning Com-
mission to send it through the economic hierarchy. At the
lowest level, the enterprises receive orders for delivery of
outputs and authorizations for inputs. The enterprises then




D. COMPARISON OF SOCIALIST AND CAPITALIST ECONOMIES
Since most of the socialist countries do not make de-
tailed economic data available for international scrutiny, it
is difficult to make statistical comparisons between social-
ist states and capitalist ones. The utility of such a
l^Thls is an application of an input-output analysis pro-
cedure developed by W. W. Leontieff in 1931. For details on
its construction see Wassily W. Leontieff, "Input-Output Eco-
nomics," S c i en t i f i c American
,
October, 1951, pp. 15-21.
Campbell F! McConnel 1 , Economics , (New York: McGraw-Hill
Book Company, 1981), pp. 651-653, provides a good summary.
16 Leeman, p. 22.
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comparison would be highly questionable because of large gaps
and uncertainties in the information. However, it is possi-
ble to learn a great deal about the nature of the socialist
economies and political systems from the information that is
published; so rough comparisons should not be rejected as
completely useless. Often, best estimates or composite fi-
gures can be quite revealing.
Before beginning any comparison of socialist and capital-
ist economies, it is important to note several caveats which
strongly limit the conclusions that could be drawn from an
examination of the information. Most important is the need
to ensure that any figures used reflect the same calculations
for both types of economies. As an example, gross national
product (GNP) data are calculated differently in capitalist
societies than in socialist ones, and the data cannot be
equated directly from one system to the other. Official Com-
munist sources use the term net material product (NMP) or na-
tional income (NI) to describe concepts similar to Western
GNP calculations; however, the figures derived from their
calculations are approximately one-fifth smaller than if cal-
culated by Western methods. *?
The second most important caveat is the need to recog-
nize that writers in both economic systems tend to exaggerate
l?Wi lczynski
,
p. xiv. For definitions of commonly used
socialist economic terms, see Appendix A.
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the accomplishments of their own system and the failures of
the other. Conversely, they also tend to downplay the suc-
cesses of the other system and the deficiencies of their own.
Beyond these considerations
,
parti cul ar constrai nts apply
to the most common comparisons between capitalist and social-
ist economies--those dealing with per capita income and stan-
dard of living indicators. Once again, direct comparison of
data is neither advisable nor productive, for the following
reasons :
first, the Socialist figures are only rough esti-
mates, involving complex adjustments of the official
statistics of the Net Material Product in inconver-
tible currency to the Western GNP in convertible
currency;
second, as a rule a Socialist centrally-planned
economy devotes a lower proportion of its national
income to current consumption (favouring higher
investment and defence spending than is typical of
a capitalist economy at the same level of economic
development ; the relatively high Soviet spending
on defence and space programmes largely explains
why the observable standard of living is lower in
the USSR than in Poland, Hungary, and Bulgaria;
third, in the Socialist countries (as compared with
the developed West) working hours are relatively
long (42-50 a week against 36-42 a week) and annual
holidays are shorter (2-3 weeks against 3-5 weeks);
fourth, the range of consumer goods and services is
usually smaller, and their quality (including ser-
vice in shops) is poorer; there are frequent short-
ages (and consequent queues and waiting lists);
there is partial rationing in some of them (China,
Cuba, Poland and Vietnam); and there are irritating
restrictions on personal freedom.
On the other hand, the facts that may detract from
the standard of living may be compensated to vary-
ing degrees in different Socialist countries by the
absence of unemployment, the reasonable stability
23
of prices, the availability of comprehensive and
generous social security and a more even distribu-
tion of personal income and assets than is typical
under capitalism. 18
Keeping these caveats and constraints in mind, there are,
nevertheless, general comparisons between capitalism and so-
cialism which can be both useful and instructive. The most
important difference between the two economic systems is who
assumes the responsibility and risks of investment. Because
capitalism depends on private investment, development in any
sector is always a function of individuals' interests and
perceptions of potential benefits or losses. Although the
profit motive can be extremely powerful, it does not guaran-
tee investments. The possibility that key sectors of the
economy could suffer from underinvestment while less vital
areas are oversupplied is everpresent.
On the other hand, under socialism, the state owns the
means of production and is responsible for investment. Ide-
ally production goals, determined by central planners who are
motivated by the needs of the country, not profits, drive the
allocation of resources. At least in principle, planners
will agree on the priority for and the degree of investment
in each sector based on its importance to the overall econo-
my. There is no individual risk involved. Personal prefer-
ences and desires are, theoretically, eliminated.
18Wilczynski, pp. 213-214.
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All conditions which may be described as advantages of
socialist economies derive from this fundamental difference
between capitalism and socialism. As already stated, the en-
tire economy is goal -oriented, suggesting an explicit, under-
stood, and accepted objective. For this reason, the economy
is able to focus attention and concentrate resources in spe-
cific areas. By so doing, dynamic and dramatic growth is
possible and has been achieved in important sectors such as
heavy industries. Since all efforts are directed toward ac-
complishment of the objective, the socialist system is in
effect dehumanized. In Communist theory, socialist economies
are less susceptible to whim or to the vagaries of human na-
ture than are capitalist economies (although the subsequent
economic distortions of Mao, Khrushchev, and Gierek demon-
strate the susceptibility of socialist states to the whims
and excesses of individual leaders).
The planning which is responsible for reducing suscepti-
bility of the economy to fluctuations of interest also de-
creases the potential, at least theoretically, for wasteful
production practices. Because production goals and standards
are set and because the profit motive is lacking, there is no
reason to produce articles of varying quality, to overproduce
certain items, to restrict supplies artificially, or to en-
gage in expensive sales promotions. In addition, important
outgrowths of planning are the elimination of unnecessary du-
plication of effort and the control of employment. All work,
25
by definition, is productive and useful to society, and
everyone is assured a job.
This basic tenet of socialist philosophy, the dignity of
labor, is incorporated into the very fabric of the economy.
In theory, coupling of this concept with state ownership of
the production capacity means that the workers control their
employment situations. They are not merely employees, but
also employers. Selfishly motivated exploitation of the
workers and disruptive strikes are theoretically replaced by
a spirit of cooperation. All workers share equally in the
responsibility for achieving the set production goals. As a
result, workers i deal i stical ly can expect an equal share in
the outcome of their production efforts. According to Com-
munist theory, there should be a more even distribution of
income in socialist countries than in capitalist ones. Addi-
tionally, although the overall standard of living in social-
ist countries is lower than in capitalist societies, there
should be yery few examples of extreme poverty or extreme
wealth. 19 (Once again, however, socialist practice does not
conform to the theory. Political and military elites enjoy
a standard of living well above that of the average citizen.
They have access to better quality merchandise and services,
including such "luxuries" as private homes and automobiles.
For others in the system, basic survival is a struggle.)
19Wilczynski, pp. 214-216.
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The description of the advantages of socialism vis-a-vis
capitalism may appear to be simplistic; however these are de-
monstrable characteristics of the system. It is interesting
to note that the capitalist economies also attempt to control
economic conditions to ensure full employment and develop a
more equitable distribution of income. They come closest to
achieving these goals through government regulation or when
they adopt socialist practices in the production sector. As
an example of the latter situation, workers in many factories
have joined together to buy the plants where they work to en-
sure their continued employment. Another example is prolif-
eration of agricultural cooperatives in capitalist countries.
Although participation in such ventures is voluntary, workers
in capitalist countries, in ever-increasing numbers, are get-
ting involved in activities that could be considered social-
ist behavior.
E. PROBLEMS OF SOCIALIST ECONOMIES
The most important theoretical advantages of socialism,
planning and goal -orientation, paradoxically, create its most
serious problems. While socialist states acknowledge that
the role of central planning organizations is vital to the
successful functioning of the economy, they tend to overlook
or ignore the need for economic background and expertise
among those chosen as members of the State Planning Commis-
sion. Ideological concerns predominate instead. The result
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is planning decisions that are ideologically acceptable; they
may make little or no economic sense.
Because economic decisions reflect ideology, there can be
no flexibility in interpretation or implementation. To en-
sure strict compliance with Party dictates, a huge bureau-
cracy is necessary. The nature of bureaucratic organization
contributes to the rigidity of the system and its inability
to respond effectively and expeditiously to problems or po-
tential opportunities.
In addition to the adverse effects of ideology and bu-
reaucracy, socialist countries compound their problems by at-
tempting to conduct economic planning at the macro-economic
level only. There is virtually no attempt to deal with the
micro-economic issues that impinge on the productive capacity
and capability of the enterprises. Problems of management
and use of resources at operational levels are neglected.
The combination of these ideological, bureaucratic, and
macro-economic constraints serves to magnify any judgmental
errors made in the planning process. Even if decisions were
economically sound and carefully considered the relationship
between macro-economic and micro-economic issues, the poten-
tial for error increases as the number of decisions to be
made increases. The vastness of the system creates its own
environment for error.
Beyond the problems created by centralized planning, so-
cialist economies also suffer from the lack of an appropriate
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pricing system. With restricted involvement in the interna-
tional market pricing of goods and the lack of a domestic
free market system, the socialist countries arbitrarily "fix"
prices for economic items, without taking into account the
factor costs for producing the items. In many instances,
prices are artificially low and supplies of items are quickly
depleted. In those cases, the government must intervene with
rationing to prevent wide-spread disruption of the economy.
This problem highlights another common feature of conven-
tional socialist economies--the consumer cannot affect type,
number, or price of goods, even in the consumption market.
Availability, style, and price of consumer items are deter-
mined by central planners. Because there is no competition
for consumer purchasing power, there is no incentive for con-
sumption oriented enterprises to upgrade item quality; and
because there is no danger that consumption oriented enter-
prises will be forced to close because of poor quality prod-
ucts, mediocre items that would not survive in a competitive
environment have become the hallmark of the system. 20
Despite the shortcomings of the conventional socialist
system of economic development, it has proven to be a dynamic
and dramatic force. It is capable of significant growth and
influence. The principles of socialism are attractive to
much of the worl d.
20Wilczynski, pp. 217-219.
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As previously mentioned, capitalist countries are adopt-
ing socialist principles in limited i nstances--speci f
i
cal ly
involving employee ownership of industrial plants and agri-
cultural cooperati ves--to address employment problems or in-
come distribution considerations. It is in the Third World,
however, that Soviet-style socialism exhibits its greatest
appeal. Many Third World countries are drawn to it because
it affords them the means of rapid industrialization and dra-
matic growth in production capacity. The intense desire of
the Third World countries to "catch up" with industrialized
countries in terms of economic development is used as justi-
fication for adopting socialism. The fact that no country
has approached Western standards of development by employing
Soviet-style socialist practices does not reduce socialism's
attractiveness to Third World leaders.
More important than economic growth potential for many
of these leaders, however, is socialism's appeal from an ide-
ological perspective. It provides a rationale for central-
ized control of all facets of political as well as economic
life in the country. This concentration of power creates a
ruling elite and also provides for its protection. Political
leaders can justify government intrusion into social activi-
of citizens, "legally" explaining any measures they deem to
be necessary to maintain the system. For these reasons, the
ambitions of many leaders are well served by adopting social-
ist practices.
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III. EAST EUROPEAN ECONOMIES
A. COMMON DEVELOPMENT
Between the end of World War II in 1945 and October 1949,
when the German Democratic Republic (East Germany) was for-
mally established, the Soviet Union consolidated its hold on
Eastern Europe. An integral feature of the Communist Party
rise to power in each country was the creation of a socialist
economic system. In almost all of the countries, Soviet mil-
itary power was needed to install the new government and to
initiate the transition to socialism. It is not surprising,
therefore, that the new socialist economies in Eastern Europe
should have been essentially mirror-images of the Soviet mo-
del, the only functioning socialist system in existence at
that time. (Even Tito in Yugoslavia patterned his original
economic program on Soviet experience. It was only after the
rift between Stalin and Tito that Yugoslavia launched its in-
dependent economic policy.)
After the imposition of Communist Party rule and social-
ist economic order, each country began its five-year plan of
initial development, roughly corresponding to the 1949-1953
time frame. These years have come to be known as the Stalin-
ization period, because of the complete domination Stalin
exerted over Eastern European economies during this time. He
demanded that each new socialist state follow exactly the
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Soviet pattern of development. This meant strong emphasis
on heavy industries and collectivization of farms. Thriving
East European light industries and private farms were unac-
ceptable remnants of capitalist influence. Relentless effort
to eradicate these influences created the perception in the
West, by the end of the 1950's, of the Eastern European coun-
tries as mere satellites in the Soviet Union's orbit.
This perception of the Eastern European countries as ex-
tensions of the Soviet Union, in economic as well as politi-
cal terms, persisted for many years. That these countries
traded predominantly among themselves and concealed economic
data from outside examination contributed to this perception.
In contrast to Stalin's approach to economic development
in Eastern Europe with its emphasis on conformity to the So-
viet experience, Khrushchev wanted to create a supranational
economic organization to take advantage of the different eco-
nomic potential of each country. Under this plan, certain
countries would concentrate on raw materials and agricultural
products—primary products--f or supply to those countries
with industrial capacity to process them. This would, theo-
retically, maximize each country's potential contribution to
the advancement of socialism.
Khrushchev's plan met with resistance as had Stalin's be-
fore him. Those countries designated as sources of primary
products interpreted the plan as an attempt to restrict their
devel opment--to prevent their industrialization and economic
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advancement. In response to what they perceived to be Soviet
exploitation, Eastern European Communist bloc countries began
to develop economic policies that did not conform to the So-
viet experience. These policies reflected the unique ethnic
character and economic realities in each country. The period
of detente in the early to mid-1970's provided opportunities
for broad trade relations with the West and created an atmo-
sphere for greater divergence from the Soviet model.
B. ECONOMIC CHARACTERISTICS OF EASTERN EUROPEAN COMMUNIST
BLOC COUNTRIES (EXCLUDING ROMANIA)
Since the mid-1960's, the countries of Eastern Europe's
Communist bloc have attempted to pursue individualistic ap-
proaches to socialism. No country has abandoned or rejected
the basic socialist principles of centralized planning and
control; but each has modified these principles and incorpo-
rated features which give its economy, in varying degrees, a
unique, nationalistic stamp. In so doing, they have had dif-
ferent degrees of success, both in improving economic condi-
tions in the country and in maintaining good relations with
the Soviet Union.
1. Bui garia
The Peoples Republic of Bulgaria is the smallest of
the Eastern European economies. It is also one of the less
developed countries of Eastern Europe. It is still primarily
an agricultural state, but it has made significant strides
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in industrialization. In 1981, Bulgaria reported the highest
economic growth rate in Eastern Europe. "National income in-
creased by 7.2 percent, chiefly because of increased labor
productivity, expanded industrial production, and growth in
several key sectors including chemicals, electronics, machin-
ery, and light industry. "21
Bulgaria's brand of socialism emphasizes gradual de-
centralization of the economy and more freedom for the indi-
vidual enterprises. The trend began in the mid-1960's with a
pilot program of management independence in a single textile
factory. The experiment worked, and the concept slowly
spread to other enterpri ses .22 i n the 1970's, the program of
decentralization acquired the name New Economic Mechanism
(NEM). This program has been credited with a major role in
increasing the growth rate of the agricultural sector in
1979. Agriculture continues to account for more than 25 per-
cent of Bulgaria's national income. 23
The following four principles of Bulgaria's New Eco-
nomic Mechanism seem to run counter to the most fundamental
2 *Karen Jurew, "Trade Expansion Underlies Steady Eco-
nomic Growth," Business America
,
Volume 5, Number 16, Au-
gust 9, 1982, p. 18.
22Eric Bourne, "A Guide to Creeping Capitalism in the
East Bloc," Christian Science Monitor
,
March 24, 1983, p. 9.
23"Five-Year Plan Provides Opportunities for Trade and
Industrial Cooperation," Business America
,
Volume 4, Num-
ber 20, October 5, 1981, p. 15.
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Economic accountability and self-support by
each enterprise. Every production unit is to
rise and fall on its own. State subsidies,
which were formally (sic) granted to enter-















ion in centralized planning. Planning
bove--the process by which the central
rs prescribe a set of guidelines for
nterprise such as rates of production of
ent commodities, is to be substantially
d. The individual enterprise is to make
n "counterpl an" which fills in the de-
of how these general targets are to be
nd what articles to produce that are not
ined by state plans. It is in this ap-
of "planning from below" that the en-
se is expected to use
ximize its return.
its own initiative
Self support. The state is gradually ending
all subsidies to enterprises which previously
could not pay their debts out of their own ca-
pital. Now the principle to be followed is
that the enterprise—and its workers--wi 1 1 not
be entitled to take from the economy more than
they have given it. By linking wages with out-
put, it is hoped that workers will have more
incentive to produce more goods of higher qual-
ity.
4. Brigade system. This system of self-sufficiency
and accountability is to be applied, wherever
practical, at the lowest work level --that of
the brigade. 24
Deriving approximately one-third of its national in-
come from its exports, Bulgaria has the most trade-dependent
24"Planners Appear to be Looking to the West to Find An-
swers Plaguing the Economy," Business America
,
Volume 3, Num
ber 10, May 19, 1980, pp. 28-T.
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economy of the Eastern European bloc countries. The great
majority of this trade, averaging 80 percent, has consis-
tently been with other bloc countries and the Soviet Union,
which alone accounts for 55 percent of Bulgaria's foreign
trade. Although Bulgaria is willing to continue the rela-
tionship it shares with these trading partners, the predomi-
nant concern among Bulgarian officials is the modernization
of the Bulgarian economy. Recognizing that significant tech-
nological inputs from the West are necessary to achieve this
goal, Bulgaria began pursuing a policy of expanding trade
ties with the West in the mid-1970* s.
A major initiative designed to expand economic coop-
eration with the West is the joint venture law. Promulgated
in March 1980, this law promotes formation of jointly-owned
enterprises operated in Bulgaria or third countries. Activi-
ties of these ventures are deliberately outside the framework
of the state economic plan. 25 Recent examples of such joint
ventures are the opening of Pierre Cardin boutiques and a
Pizza Hut in Bulgaria and a contract for Bulgaria to build
the British Perkins engine. 26
Another deviation from the socialist planning model
is the introduction of single-year plans within the context
25
"Planners Looking to West," p. 30
26 Eric Bourne, "Pizza Hut Communism Splits East Bloc,"
Christian Science Monitor, November 19, 1982, p. 6.
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of existing five-year plans. This practice occurred for the
first time in late 1978. Output targets established in 1976
for 1980 were readjusted downward to reflect the realities of
Bulgaria's economic condi tions .27 The government's tendency
to reduce quantitative targets is expected to continue.
Because of their relative economic successes, Bulga-
rians are fairly well satisfied and there is little potential
for disturbances motivated by economic issues. "There are no
queues in Sofia, the food shops are well stocked and prices
are low." 28 Additionally, politically motivated agitation is
not yery likely. "Laws severely punish anyone accused of
slandering the state ... .There is no known organized dissident
movement. "29
In terms of its relations with the Soviet Union, Bul-
garia is "Moscow's most unswervingly loyal ally in political
matters and foreign affairs. "30 Its relationship to Moscow
is probably best demonstrated in the circumstantial evidence
linking Bulgarian secret agents to the assassination attempt
27"Move Toward Greater Decentralization of Economy Could
Facilitate Closer Ties with U.S. Business," Business America
,
Volume 2, Number 12, June 4, 1979, p. 13.
28
"The Un-Polish News," Economist
,
Volume 281, Num-
ber 7212, November 21, 1981, p. 59.
^Bernard Gwertzman, "East Europe Measures Its Freedom by
Inches," New York Times
,
December 21, 1980, p. 4D.
30Frederick B. Chary, "Bulgaria: The Solace of History,"
Current History, Volume 80, Number 465, April 1981, p. 164.
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on the Pope in 1981. Bulgaria has a reputation for obeying
Soviet decisions and adhering to Soviet advice, even to the
detriment of its own interests. Bulgarian efforts to forge
links with the West to improve its economy are seriously un-
dermined by its connections to Soviet-directed intrigue in
foreign affairs.
Bulgarian obedience, almost subservience, to Moscow
can be understood in light of the historical relationship be-
tween the two countries. Unlike other Eastern European coun-
tries, Bulgaria has no historic animosity toward Russians or
the Soviet Union. In fact, Bulgarians regard Russia as their
liberator, dating from the freeing of Bulgaria from 500 years
of Ottoman Turkish rule by Tsar Alexander. 31 In addition,
Bulgarians feel indebted to the Soviet Union for assisting in
their industrial development after World War II.
Increased tensions between Moscow and Belgrade could
exacerbate Bulgarian territorial quarrels with Yugoslavia
over Macedonia and cause Bulgarian officials to re-evaluate
the relationship with the Soviet Union. Barring this, there
are no indications of change in the foreseeable future.
2. Czechosl ovakia
Before World War II, Czechoslovakia was one of the
most economically advanced countries in Eastern Europe, and
31 James Kelly, "To Russia With Love," Time
,
Volume 131,
Number 7, February 14, 1983, p. 49.
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the quality of Czechoslovak products compared favorably with
that of other industrial countries. In 1981, the Czechoslo-
vak Socialist Republic ranked "among the ten most industrial-
ized societies by some measures, and among the communist
nations, was second only to the German Democratic Republic
in the prosperity and standard of living of its people. "32
The high ranking among industrialized nations in 1981
is misleading, however; Czechoslovakia failed to meet many of
its economic goals, and "only one-fifth of Czechoslovakia's
industrial export products meet quality standards required on
world markets. "^^ Consumer demands for food and other neces-
sities are barely met.
After the Soviet intervention crushed the economic
reform movement in 1968, Czechoslovakia reverted to a rigid,
Stalinist economy. In the following five years, the Czecho-
slovak economy exhibited tremendous growth in some key areas.
There was a 32 percent increase in net material product, a 27
percent increase in personal consumption, and a five percent
increase in real wages during this period. 34
32Richard F. Nyrop (ed. ) , Czechosl ovakia : A Country
Study
,
(Washington, D.C.: U.S~7 Government Printing Office,
1982), p. 115.
33otto Ulc, "Czechoslovakia and the Polish Virus," Cur-
rent History
,
Volume 80, Number 465, April 1981, p. TT5T.
34 viadimir V. Kusin, "Husak's Czechoslovakia and Econo-
mic Stagnation," Problems of Communism
,
Volume 31, Number 3,
May-June 1982, p .~TT.
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Although the specific causes for this upsurge in the
economy are not known, it has been postulated that an impli-
cit social contract was forged between the Czechoslovak gov-
ernment and the population that states, "the rulers rule and
the citizenry is rewarded with a relatively high standard of
living and the opportunity to attend to its private affairs
in exchange for not meddling in public affairs. "35 i n e f_
feet, Czechoslovaks channeled their energies away from poli-
tical and economic activism into the more mundane tasks of
achieving maximum output from an existing system, and their
efforts were rewarded.
The rosy picture darkened in 1973, though, as the ef-
fect of the oil crisis began to be felt. Although Czechoslo-
vakia was not directly affected by the price increase by the
Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC ) --al most
98 percent of Czechoslovak oil needs was met by imports from
the Soviet Union--it became an indirect victim. As a result
of the recession in the capitalist world triggered by the oil
crisis, markets for Czechoslovak exports shrank. "The year
1973. ..was a watershed for the Czechoslovak economy. The
balance sheet turned from black to red, from surplus to de-
ficit. "36 When the Soviet Union later raised its oil prices,
Czechoslovakia suffered a severe blow from which it could not
35 Ulc, p. 154.
36 Ibid., p. 155.
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recover without drastic change in the structure of the econo-
my. Since such change was not forthcoming, the Czechoslovak
economy stagnated in the latter half of the 1970's. Problems
of low producti vi tiy , energy and material waste, and misallo-
cation of resources contributed to the decline in economic
performance.
In 1980, the Czechoslovak government introduced the
"Set of Measures," a program designed to improve its system
of planned management throughout the coming decade. The pro-
gram was intended "to increase enterprises' decision-making
authority, to provide specific incentives to management and
labor, to make more efficient use of resources, to encourage
innovation, and to stimulate production for export. "37
With such broad guidelines, the program had the po-
tential to make structural changes in the system which could
have effected genuine reforms in the economy. In practice,
it has proven to be "a cosmetic exercise intent only on bet-
tering the working of the existing system. "38
Achieving program goals is a formidable task. Reali-
zing that the customary five-year plans required constant ad-
justments in the economic targets, Czechoslovakia's planners
3?Karen L. Jurew, "Cautious Economic Policies are Limit-
ing U.S. Exports," Business America
,
Volume 5, Number 16,
August 9, 1982, p. 1TI
38Eric Bourne, "Czechoslovakia: Fifteen Years After So-
viet Invasion, Prague Stagnates," Christian Science Monitor
,
August 22, 1983, p. 12.
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have begun to prepare annual plans instead; but even these
plans require reduction in the target figures. Czechoslova-
kia's Communist Party did not adopt its Five-Year Plan for
1981-85 until December 1981, "at the end of the first year of
the period for which the plan was to direct the economy. "39
The general guidelines of the 1981-85 Plan suggest--not di-
rect—low rates of growth and investment. These guidelines
reflect the need to adjust to rising costs of energy and raw
materials and declining supplies of these goods. Czechoslo-
vakia must also modernize existing plants and equipment if it
hopes to improve labor productivity, reduce raw material and
energy inputs, and improve the quality of its exports. ^0
Because the economic system has become increasingly
deficient in satisfying the needs of its citizens, Czechoslo-
vakia is ripe for discontent and dissent. In June, 1983, a
group of approximately 300 young Czechoslovak participants in
a government-sponsored peace conference in Prague broke away
from a rally of 2600 delegates from 140 countries. They
staged a protest march through the streets demanding freedom
and the abolition of the army. The demonstration was quickly
squelched by police and several arrests were made. This was
the first major protest in Prague in the 15 years since the
3 9 Kusin, p. 34.
40
"U.S. Firms Should Act to Promote Exports," Business
America, Volume 4, Number 20, October 5, 1981,' p. 11
.
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Soviet invasion in 1968,41 but it is not the only example of
recent dissent and unrest in the Czechoslovak capital.
Charter 77 is a group of intellectuals and dissidents
that formed in 1977 after the signing of the Helsinki Accords
on Human Rights. After a few proclamations of Czechoslovak
violations of human and civil rights in the late 1970's, the
group became dormant. In the first eight months of 1983,
however, Charter 77 stepped up its activity, including send-
ing a letter of support of Polish Solidarity leaders. This
"represents a revival of dissent. "42
The influence of the Catholic Church, though not as
pervasive as in Poland, is another factor which could affect
expressions of dissent in Czechoslovakia. Since 75 percent
of the population is Roman Catholic, its potential influence
is significant. In August 1983, for the first time in two
decades, a Catholic primate directly charged the Czechoslovak
government with discrimination against religion.
In a letter to the government Office for Church Af-
fairs, Cardinal Tomasek challenged official claims that the
government supports the church through stipends and does not
restrict training for the priesthood. His action at this
time was possibly prompted by a recent growth in the appeal
41
"Czech Protesters Call for Freedom," New York Times
,
June 23, 1983, p. 6.
42 Nyrop, p. 58.
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of the church to youth, which is causing concern among gov-
ernment official s.^3
These incidents suggest that an undercurrent of un-
rest exists in Czechoslovakia. The strong memories of 1968,
along with the continued presence of 70-80,000 Soviet troops
in the country, however, reduce the possibility of any seri-
ous disturbances.
3. East Germany
The German Democratic Republic (GDR) has the strong-
est economy in Eastern Europe. It is the most highly indus-
trialized and technologically advanced of the Communist bloc
countries and ranks among the top ten industrial nations in
the world.
Despite its accomplishments, the East German economy
is threatened from several sources: geographical constraint
on growth, declining population, and few natural resources.
Because, in part, East German success in the past resulted
from trade with the West--the GDR is, in effect, a backdoor
member of the European Common Market as a result of its spe-
cial relationship with the Federal Republic of Germany--it
was particularly hard hit by the recession in the West, espe-
cially because of inflation and high interest rates. The GDR
depends on its export markets to provide the necessary funds
43Eric Bourne, "Czech Church Speaks Against Discrimina-
tion," Christian Science Monitor, August 26, 1983, p. 3.
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to repay its debt to Western governments and banks. However,
markets in the West for East German goods that decreased in
recent years have not yet begun to recover. The GDR has




East Germany has traditionally been one of the most
faithful adherents of the Stalinist model of economic devel-
opment. Nevertheless, in the 1970's, in an effort to deal
with the increasing economic pressures it was suffering, the
GDR initiated a fundamental change in its industrial and com-
mercial organization. The two-stage restructuring of indus-
trial production makes East German industries more flexible
and more responsive to world market conditions.
In the first stage, 90 percent of East German indus-
trial production was subordinated to 129 kombinate . A kombi -
nat is an organization of enterprises and factories which
engage in production of similar products, use similar techno-
logies, or carry out sequential production stages within the
same industrial sector. Under the reorganization, functions
common to each sector, such as research and development, sup-
ply, and construction, are consolidated under the authority
of a general director of the kombi nat . This individual is
responsible for implementation of all possible methods of
^Arthur M. Hanhardt, Jr., "The German Democratic Repub-
lic," Current History
,
Volume 81, Number 478, November 1982,
p . 36 7
.
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modernizing industrial capacity and the translation of sci-
entific and technical developments into producti on
.
4 5
Concurrent with the reorganization of industry, East
Germany has embarked on a program of vigorous economic growth
in the 1980's. In fact, the GDR was the only East European
Communist bloc country to expand its economic targets for
1981, rather than cutting them back. 46 The 1981-85 Five-Year
Plan calls for a 5.5 percent annual growth rate. The stra-
tegy for achieving this goal is to raise labor productivity
and increase economic efficiency. The proposed means to ac-
complish these twin objectives are through accelerated scien-
tific and technological development and the introduction of
new industrial techniques. Other objectives of the plan are
expanded efforts to increase hard currency earnings, improve-
ments in the balance of trade, and steady improvements in the
availability of consumer products.
This last item is a growing concern for East German
economic planners. Although East Germany has the highest
standard of living of any Communist country, or perhaps due
to the higher expectations--the comparison for East German
economic conditions among the population is not other Eastern
4 5"Emphasis is on Industrial Reorganization, Expansion of
Economy and Foreign Trade," Business America
,
Volume 4, Num-
ber 20, October 5, 1981, p. Ti
46 Suzanne F. Porter, "Trade Apparatus Reorganized in Ef-
fort to Expand Trade," Business America
,
Volume 4, Number 3,
February 9, 1981, p. 24.
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European bloc countries, but rather West Germany--East Ger-
mans do not accept shortages complacently. Press reports re-
veal that East Germans are becoming increasingly discontented
with their economic state of affairs.
In November 1982, workers "called on Communist Party
officials to explain the persistent unpredictability in food
supplies, and had threatened to stage a work stoppage unless
the situation improved. " 4 7 In some instances, dissent has
gone beyond mere threats. In late December 1982, a pipefit-
ter who had installed fireplaces and heating systems in homes
of Communist Party leaders and functionaries attempted to re-
dress his economic grievances. Saying that he was "incensed
to see the comparative luxury the leaders lived in," he tried
to assassinate the East German head of state Erich Honecker
during a motorcade. When the attempt was thwarted by Honeck-
er's bodyguards, the assailant committed suicide. 48
Even when faced with such obvious signs that economic
change to meet the needs and desires of the population is im-
perative, East German planners limit economic reform measures
to maneuvers within the existing structure. Memories of the
Soviet actions of 1953, while not as close to the surface as
those in Czechoslovakia or Hungary, nonetheless are vivid
^"Shortages in East Germany are Reported to Stir Un
rest," New York Times
,
November 22, 1982, p. 3.
48
"East German Assassination Try Reported," Monterey Pe
ninsula Herald (CA), January 12, 1983, p. 11.
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reminders of the consequence of reforms that get too far out
of hand. The presence of Soviet troops in East Germany is
also an effective deterrent against drastic or rapid economic
reforms that could erupt into major political disturbances.
The government of the German Democratic Republic will never
take, nor will it ever permit, any actions in any sphere,
economic, political, or social, which could provoke Soviet
military intervention.
4. Hungary
The economic system in the Peoples Republic of Hun-
gary is a bold example of divergence from the Soviet model.
It is characterized by decentralization of planning and pri-
vate ownership of property and business. Such concepts, al-
though seemingly anathema in a socialist system, have been
practiced successfully in Hungary for more than two decades.
One consequence of the short-lived Hungarian uprising
in 1956 was the break-up of the collective farm system crea-
ted during Hungary's Stalinist period. The new government,
under Janos Kadar, gave priority attention to re-collectivi-
zing agriculture. However, instead of confiscating property
and forcing participation in collective farms, the government
emphasized creation of cooperatives and permitted retention
of some private plots of land. Today, approximately twelve
percent of arable land in Hungary is privately owned.
For twenty years, Hungary invested heavily in its ag-
riculture sector, in contrast to the other Eastern European
48
bloc countries, which sacrificed agriculture to concentrate
on heavy industry. 49 By maintaining a realistic balance of
investment, Hungary made agriculture the backbone of its eco-
nomy. As a result, unlike most of the other countries of the
Eastern European bloc, Hungary is not currently experiencing
shortages in food staples. There are no bread lines or ra-
tion coupons. Hungary is not only able to feed itself, but
it also exports large quantities of food. During the 1970's,
Hungary became a net exporter of food, in contrast to its si-
tuation at the beginning of the 1960's, when Hungary was a
net importer of food. 50
In 1968, Hungary began to apply the principles that
had worked so well in agriculture to its industrial sector.
The New Economic Mechanism, as the Hungarian reform process
is called, established the following three important changes:
1) it did away with much of the unnecessary central organiza-
tion and direction of the economy; 2) it introduced elements
of a more rational pricing system; and 3) it allowed the mar-
market to play a role in the equilibrium between supply and
demand .51
49 Paul Lewis, "What Poland Lacks, Hungary Has Aplenty,"
New York Times
,
December 20, 1981, p. 2E.
50
"Trade Opportunities Merit Close Attention," Business
America
,
Volume 4, Number 20, October 5, 1981, p. 5
.
Silvan Volgyes, "The Kadar Years in Hungary," Current
History, Volume 80, Number 465, April 1981, p. 159.
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By extending these principles to their logical con-
clusion, it becomes apparent that the ultimate goal of Hun-
gary's New Economic Mechanism is the creation of a socialist
economy "in which businesses compete with each other and
workers and managers share in the profits. "^2 Hungary is
moving purposefully in this direction. Two events in foreign
trade and domestic economic policy illustrate this point.
The most significant event with regard to Hungary's
foreign trade policy occurred in May 1983, when it became a
member of the International Monetary Fund. (Romania joined
the Fund in 1973 and is the only other member nation from the
Eastern European Communist bloc.) Hungary is also a member
of the World Bank and the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade. Like Romania, Hungary also has a Most Favored Nation
trade agreement with the United States.
The significant domestic economic event of 1982 oc-
curred in January when Hungary passed a law permitting citi-
zens to go into business for themselves. Individuals may
sell goods or services for profit. Cooperative ventures of
up to thirty persons may lease commercial property from the
state, and, after completing their usual work day, sell their
services to employers on a contract basis. The cooperative
is required to pay taxes on 100 percent of the profits, but
52samuel L. Sharp, The Soviet Union and Eastern Europe
1981
,
(Washington, D.C.: Stryker-Post Publications, Inc.,
T9T8T), p. 78.
50
anything that remains after taxes may be divided among the
members of the cooperati ve. 53
By taking this action, which, according to the chief
of economic planning for the Hungarian government, Gyorgy
Szepesi, was under discussion for three years prior to final
legislative action, Hungary became the first Eastern European
bloc country to legalize its "second economy." 54 Other East-
ern European bloc countries tolerate the existence of their
"second economies," tacitly acknowledging that they fill the
gaps in the state-controlled system as tfell as providing an
acceotable outlet for oooular sxoression of economic discon-
tent.' Most turn an official blind eye on such extra-system
activities, and some, most notably Czechoslovakia and the
German Democratic Republic, show some degree of official ap-
proval. However, Hungary is the only Eastern European bloc
5
^Dan Fisher, "Entrepreneurship Comes to Hungary," Monte -

















country to establish private business enterprises officially
as part of its economic system. 55
Paralleling the increased private initiative in the
economy, which at the beginning of 1983 numbered more than
11,000 ventures with 80,000 employees, Hungary introduced a
change in its political system as well. The Hungarian gov-
ernment announced in July 1983 that the next elections (in
1985) will feature a choice of candidates for nearly all gov-
ernment positions, from local level to national parliament.
Only top leadership positions, presumably, will be exempted
from the rule. 56
Although Hungary's approach to economic development
appears somewhat radical for a socialist country, it has not
yet caused any friction with the Soviet Union. In fact, So-
viet leaders have praised the Hungarian system for employing
rational solutions to pressing problems. They are examining
the Hungarian model for possible application to the Soviet
economy.
The apparent lack of Soviet concern for such sweeping
changes in the Hungarian system can be attributed to one im-
portant fact: the changes in the economy in no way threaten
or even challenge the dominance of the Communist Party in
55pan Cook, "Free Enterprise in Communist Hungary," San
Francisco Examiner-Chronicle
,
March 22, 1982, p. 2G.
56sophie Kujda, "Hungary Introduces Some Choice Into
Elections," Christian Science Monitor, July 22, 1983, p. 1.
52
Hungary. Hungary's Communist Party has accomplished a pri-
mary goal of political parties the world over--it has legiti-
macy. The Party has achieved this legitimacy "by giving the
population economic benefits in exchange for their acquies-
cence in the party's rule: a depol i tici zed polity is never a
threat to centralized political rule. "5?
This is not to say that there is not discontent in
Hungary. Dissidents number approximately 200, including a
youth group called the Dialogue for Peace, which calls on
both the Soviet Union and the United States to negotiate for
peace. Since this contrasts with the official Hungarian pol-
icy of always praising Soviet efforts to negotiate peace in
the world, the group was harassed by police until it disban-
ded. No arrests were made. 58
A similar example of official restraint in dealing
with dissidence is the situation of a group of intellectuals
who were producing samizdat --i11ega!1y published pamphlets
usually produced by underground movements and distributed to
people who oppose the government. Their base of operations
was a bookstore operated by Laszlo Rajk, son of the Hunga-
rian foreign minister executed by Stalin and later returned
to official favor. For five months, police made an obvious
show of watching the bookstore. They stopped all customers
57 Volgyes, p. 159.
58 Kujda, p. 12.
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entering the store and requested identification. On two oc-
casions, they searched the bookstore, apparently looking for
s a m i z d a t documents. The warning was so obvious, that the in-
tellectuals closed down their operation, and the bookstore
went out of business. Once again, no arrests were made.
This quiet, undramatic style is effective in avoiding
a confrontation between dissidents and the police. Hungarian
officials do not want to create martyrs whose "sufferings"
would fuel an opposition movement. Nor do officials want to
drive samizdat issues underground.
In point of fact, however, there is little need for
an underground opposition movement in Hungary. "Lines be-
tween opposition, dissent and of
f
icial ly sanctioned criticism
in Hungary are very bl urred. . . . In reality, the ideological
influence of the opposition is in the hundreds of thousands
of legal publ ications"59 in which any view may be expressed.
Because of this tolerance for opposition views and
subsequent absence of a villain as a target for the intellec-
tuals, Hungary is able to keep its small dissident population
in check. Should events lead to an increase in dissident ac-
tivity which the government finds intolerable, it can always
resort to reminders of the Soviet invasion of 1956 and allu-
sions to similar action now. Hungarians have >/ery vivid and
S^Riith E. Gruber, "Hungary Begins Crack Down on Illegal
Publications, Quietly," Leader Times (Kittanning, PA), August
8, 1983, p. 5.
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bitter memories of this event, and such reminders would be
very effective in containing dissatisfaction.
5. Pol and
Immediate post-war development in the Peoples Repub-
lic of Poland followed the same pattern as did that in other
East European Communist bloc countries. The Stalinist regime
emphasized heavy industrial growth and collectivization of
farms. As a predominantly agricultural people, Poles strenu-
ously resisted collectivization. Following Khrushchev's de-
nunciation of the "Stalin excesses" in dealing with Eastern
Europe, Poland stopped its efforts to collectivize. What
little collective farming had been established was quickly
reversed. Today, 85 percent of the farm land in Poland is
owned and operated by individual families. 60
Resistance to collectivization is typical of the Po-
lish reaction to socialism. The Western orientation and tra-
dition of private enterprises in Poland are not reconciled
easily with the principles of socialism, even after 35 years
of socialist regimes. In addition, historical enmity between
the Soviet Union and Poland probably contributed to Polish
resistance to collectivization. It was as much an expression
of Polish nationalist feeling as a struggle against an inap-
propriate economic measure. The mere fact that collectiviza-
tion was a Soviet goal heightened Polish opposition to it.
60 Sharp, p. 84.
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Because of this constant undercurrent of tension be-
tween Poland and the Soviet Union, there is always potential
for turmoil in the area. It can take the form of intra-bloc
or East-West conflict. For this reason, Poland occupies a
very special place in world interest. Since the summer of
1980, Poland has been particularly in the spotlight of world
attention. The political crisis, precipitated by the short-
comings and inequities of the Polish economy, was and still
remains a serious concern.
Poland is the largest and richest of all the Eastern
European Communist bloc countries in terms of natural resour-
ces. It also has the most troubled economy in the region,
caused by gross mismanagement during the 1970's. Poland's
development strategy throughout the decade called for simul-
taneous expansion of capital investment and consumption. To
finance pursuit of these ambitious objectives, the Polish
government borrowed heavily from Western private banks and
governments. It used these funds to import enormous amounts
of Western goods and technology to modernize its industrial
production. In the five-year period from 1971-75, Western
exports to Poland increased sixfold. 61
Initially, Poland's development strategy appeared to
be successful. National income rose sharply, as did personal
6 l"Nation Struggles with Economic Dilemma," Business
America, Volume 4, Number 20, October 5, 1981, p. 6
.
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income and standard of living during the first half of the
1970's. By the end of the decade, however, it was obvious
that Poland's development strategy had gone awry. Poland's
Western debt stood at $23 billion. 62
In part, the failure of Poland's development strategy
was a function of the worldwide recession— there was a slack-
ening of demand for traditional Polish export products. At
the same time, however, Poland's Most Favored Nation status
with the United States resulted in record-high trade, more
than $1 billion, between the two countries for three conse-
cutive years beginning in 1978, 63 so the decrease in Poland's
export market is not the major factor in its dismal economic
performance during this period.
The underlying cause of Poland's economic problems is
the inefficiency of its central -pi anni ng system. Acknowledg-
ing this fact, in early 1981, "the Polish government began to
move towards an economic reform based on decentralization of
decision-making to the enterprise level. "64 Economic reform
laws were passed later in the year dealing specifically with
worker sel
f
-management and operation of state enterprises.
62" Immediate Prospects for U.S. Business are Inhibited by
Nation's Difficult Political and Economic Situation," Busi -
ness America
,
Volume 5, Number 18, September 6, 1982, p. 22.
^Dolores F « Harrod, "Food, Agricultural Needs Dominate
Trade Picture," Business America
,
Volume 4, Number 15, Febru-
ary 9, 1981, p. TT.
64
"Immediate Prospects," p. 21.
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Implementation of the laws was postponed, though, and with
the imposition of martial law in December 1981, the govern-
ment suspended worker sel f -management , militarized the most
important industries, and extended tight central control over
14 sectors of the economy.
Declaration of martial law resulted in the imposition
of economic sanctions against Poland by the United States and
its allies. In addition, the United States did not renew the
Most Favored Nation trade agreement with Poland in 1982. It
became common practice for longshoremen throughout the capi-
talist world to boycott Polish cargo ships. Since the trade
organization of the Communist bloc--the Council for Mutual
Economic Assi stance 6 5--al so reduced its exports to Poland,
the Polish economic situation has gone from bad to worse. 66
In addition, as severe as Poland's economic problems
already are, they are further complicated by political con-
siderations. The rise of the Solidarity trade union was both
a means of redressing economic discontent and an expression
of Polish nationalism.
6i>The Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA) is an
interstate economic organization among socialist countries.
The CMEA entry in Appendix A lists current member nations.
Every member state is entitled to one vote in every working
body, regardless of size, population, or contribution to the
organization's budget. In the early 1960's, Romania spon-
sored, and won approval for, the principle that all decisions
must be unanimous. Since that time, it has used this forum
successfully to register its opposition to Soviet actions.
66
"Immediate Prospects," p. 21.
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Intense nationalism and the influence of the Catho-
lic Church played major roles in the development of the ongo-
ing Polish crisis. These two features of Polish life exert a
powerful influence on all matters affecting the state.
Poland's strategic and economic importance to social-
ism in Eastern European Communist bloc nations are key issues
which will cause the Soviet Union to react adversely to any
hint of Poland's drifting away from socialist practices.
This is particularly true if the situation is a threat to the
primacy of Communist Party rule and to strict internal con-
trol of the population. During the 1976 strikes, workers cut
a portion of the main international East-West railroad. Ever
since, the Soviets have been concerned that uncontrolled Po-
lish unrest could result in disruption or total destruction
of the vital lines of communication to the Soviet forces in
East Germany. This danger, more than any other, could prompt
Soviet intervention in Poland. 6 ?
C. SOCIALIST ECONOMIES IN NON-WARSAW PACT EASTERN EUROPEAN
COUNTRIES
No overview of socialist economies in Eastern Europe can
be complete without a brief description of the two countries
in the region which do not belong to either the Warsaw Pact
or the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance. Albania and
G^Eric Bourne, "Soviets Bypass Poland with Ferry to East
Germany," Christian Science Monitor, June 1, 1983, p. 7.
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Yugoslavia are truly unique socialist economies, with histo-
ries of independence from the Soviet style of socialism in
Europe since the early 1950's and late 1940's respectively.
These two countries represent the extremes of socialist de-
velopment—from the most rigid example of commitment to cen-
tral planning to the most liberal example of market forces at
work in a socialist economic system.
1 . Albania
In physical terms, Albania is the most isolated coun-
try in Eastern Europe. It is sealed off from its neighboring
countries by a line of almost impenetrable peaks. In politi-
cal terms, the Peoples Republic of Albania is the most isola-
ted country in the world. It is the only state in the world
that has no ties, diplomatic or otherwise, with either the
United States or the Soviet Union. Albania "has been totally
friendless since 1978, when China, its only ally and friend,
stopped the huge flow of economic and military aid it had
provided during the previous 17 years. "68 The break in rela-
tions with China marked the fourth time in its history that
Albania had broken off relations with a major donor of econo-
mic aid.
The first break severed links with the West;
...the economic cost was modest, for UNRRA (the
United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Adminis-
tration) assistance was all but terminated. The
6
^Anton Logoreci, "Albania's Future," New York Times
,
De
cember 27, 1979, p. 6.
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second break, with Yugoslavia, ended aid which
since 1945 had accumulated to $33 mi 1 1 ion. . . .The
third time, Soviet assistance amounting to $150
million during the decade of that alliance, and
all trade were stopped when the Albanian Party
turned to China in 1961. 69
The cause of Albania's seemingly self-defeating ac-
tions is paranoia toward the entire world. Albanian leader-
ship perceives the country as the only true "socialist" na-
tion of the world, beset by enemies on all sides. It is "a
society in pursuit of a single objective: physical survival
based on absolute sel f-rel iance . "70 Albanian government of-
ficials display equal revulsion toward the Soviet Union and
the United States, denouncing both as the "biggest and most
dangerous imperialist powers the world has ever known. "71
The two other most influential nations in Albania's foreign
relations in the past they categorize as either "reactionary"
(China) or "revisionist" (Yugoslavia).
Politically and economically, Albanians are proud of
this "Stalinist" distinction. Precisely because of its Sta-
linist heritage, however, Albania remains one of the least
developed countries in Eastern Europe. It is the perfect ex-
ample of the discrepancies between socialist theories and the
realities of rigid socialist practice.
69Michael Kaser, "Albania's Self-Chosen Predicament,"
World Today
,
Volume 35, Number 6, June 1979, p. 260.
70 Robert Kaplan, "Where Self-Reliance Carries a High
Price," Christian Science Monitor
,
May 19, 1983, p. 13.
71 Sharp, p. 59.
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Although it has significant deposits of copper and
nickel and is the world's sixth largest producer of chrome,
and despite industrial growth and development, Albania's pri-
mary economic sector is agriculture. In a land almost uni-
formly rocky and irregular, such insistence on the importance
of agriculture in the economy can only be explained in terms
of devotion to the Stalinist model, in which collectivization
of agriculture was so heavily emphasized.
An important reason for the consistent theme of Sta-
linist principles in Albania is the longevity of Enver Hoxha,
the only leader the Peoples Republic of Albania has ever had.
As long as he remains in power, Albania will continue to fol-
low its traditional policies.
Signs of possible change in the not-too-distant fu-
ture, however, are becoming visible. In a concluding speech
at a recent conference of party and state leaders, the appar-
ent successor to Hoxha, Ramiz Alia, made several allusions to
the prerequisites for Albanian economic development under the
1986-90 Five-Year Plan. "He referred with unusual candor to
'innovative thinking' and to inescapable 'qualitative and
quantitative' changes in economic structure within the next
plan. ..and readiness for 'radical changes' in agriculture as
well as industry to use the new technol ogies . "?2
72 Eric Bourne, "Albania: A Go-It-Alone Country," Chris -
tian Science Monitor, May 19, 1983, p. 12.
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2 . Yugoslavia
The Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia is at
the other end of the political and economic spectrum from Al-
bania. Yugoslavia was one of the founding nations of the
Non-Aligned Movement. Unlike Albania, however, it does not
shun relations with the superpowers. Yugoslav leaders simply
prefer the flexibility and independence of action afforded by
the country's non-aligned status.
Economically, Yugoslavia is the leading proponent of
the "different roads to socialism" concept. It is the exam-
ple and basis for comparison for all of the reform movements
in Eastern European Communist bloc nations.
Yugoslavia has a "socialist market economy." This
means that the Yugoslav economy is neither completely capi-
talist nor totally government-directed. Rather, it combines
features from both systems, theoretically, incorporating the
best aspects of each into a single, efficient system.
Since its break with the Soviet Union in 1948, Yugo-
slavia has pursued an independent course in both economic and
political affairs. It has experimented with schemes for both
worker self-management and for decentralization of planning.
Curiously, though these two economic features have become the
hallmarks of the Yugoslav brand of socialism, they were not
intentional developments. When it began following its "own
road to socialism," Yugoslavia did not set out to design a
different form of socialist economic structure.
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Immediately after the rift between Tito and Stalin,
Yugoslavia initiated a more repressive and intensive period
of industrialization and collectivization than had existed
prior to the break in relations. These actions may have been
an effort to prove Yugoslav socialist purity--to demonstrate
that no fundamental ideological differences existed within
the ranks of socialist nations. The replacement of its cen-
tral administrative planning by a planned market economy and
self-management were "efficiency measures determined by the
immediate need for improvement in the living conditions of
the people." 73
As a result of these dramatic changes, more and bet-
ter consumer goods became available. This in turn led to an
increase in the effectiveness of material incentives and a
decrease in the need for coercion or ideological motivation.
A new socialist order was born.
Operating on these basic principles through 1976, Yu-
goslavia's economy establ ished other innovative features. At
the same time that other socialist nations were closed off
from contacts with capitalist economies, Yugoslavia was ac-
tively pursuing economic relations with the West. It expan-
ded participation in United Nations' economic organizations
and joined related economic groups such as the International
73 Chalmers Johnson (ed.), Change in Communist Systems
,
(Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1970), p~. TTJ7.
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Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank. In contrast to the
other socialist nations which excluded themselves from econo-
mic involvement in Western organizations, Yugoslav participa-
tion became a standard, expected feature of international
economic relations.
In 1967, Yugoslavia expanded dealings with the West
still further. It became the first socialist nation to per-
mit joint venture investment with Western businesses. Later,
amendments to the law made such ventures even more attractive
and lucrative for Western companies. "By November 1978, 163
joint venture contracts had been registered. Of these, 28
involved U.S. or U .S. -subsidiary investors."^ As is evident
from these statistics, Yugoslav relations with the United
States are good. Yugoslavia has a Most Favored Nation trade
agreement with the United States. In 1981, the United States
was Yugoslavia's fourth largest trading partner. ?5
As a result of these initiatives in its international
economic relations, and with a firm commitment to its basic
principles of decentralization and self-management, Yugosla-
via's economy achieved a sustained growth rate of six percent
74"Good Prospects for U.S. Exports Continue as Policies
Are Implemented to Stabilize Negative Trends in Economy,"
Business America, Volume 2, Number 22, October 22, 1979,
p. 17.
^Geoffrey Jackson, "Business Opportunities Exist Despite
Economic Problems," Business America
,
Volume 4, Number 3,
February 9, 1981, p. TTI
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per year through 1976. This figure places Yugoslavia's eco-
nomic growth at approximately the half-way point among East
European countries during this time frame. While not as dra-
matic as the growth in some countries--Romani a , for example
increased its national income during the 1970-75 period by
11.5 percent; Poland, by 9.8 percent; and Bulgaria by 7.9
percent 7 ^--Yugosl avia sustained the same level of growth for
a longer period than any of the others. It did not exhibit
the large fluctuations characteristic of other socialist
countries during this time.
In the mid-1970's, Yugoslavia began to feel the ef-
fects of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries
(OPEC) price increases, the worldwide recession, and infla-
tion. By 1979, a number of negative trends appeared in the
economy: overheated domestic demand, high levels of foreign
borrowing, poor export performances, and upward pressure on
wages and prices. 77
In response to these pressures, the Yugoslav govern-
ment embarked on a sustained stabilization strategy in late
1979. The key features of this strategy include compression
of domestic demand, slackening off of investments, curbs on
76paul Marer, "East European Economies: Achievements,
Problems, Prospects," in Communism in Eastern Europe
,
edited
by Teresa Rakowska-Harmstone and Andrew Gyorgy, ( Bl oomi ngton,
IN: Indiana University Press, 1979), p. 255.
77
"Good Prospects," p. 16.
66
imports, and channeling energies and resources into exports.
Repayment of the foreign debt is a top economic priority. ^8
Yugoslavia owes approximately $10 billion to private
banks and another $8 billion to Western governments. Compar-
isons with Poland are inevitable, but Western officials are
quick to point out that a decided difference between the two
situations exists. "The Yugoslavs are facing a cash-flow
problem rather than the specter of insolvency."^
In the midst of the severest recession since World
War II, the Yugoslav government is making a considerable ef-
fort to meet its loan repayment schedule. It has opposed any
rescheduling of its repayment requirements, declaring that
such action merely postpones the problem. However, servicing
of foreign debts is taking its toll on the Yugoslav economy.
In 1982, ten percent of Yugoslavia's national income
was devoted to repayment of foreign debts. To deal with the
problem, the Yugoslav government instituted an economic aus-
terity program to reduce domestic consumption and increase
exports in order to increase hard currency earnings. 80 Mea-
sures include a drop in public investment by approximately 20
^Geoffrey Jackson, "Austerity Measures Make U.S. Sales
More Difficult," Business America
,
Volume 5, Number 16, Au-
gust 9, 1982, p. TT.
? 9John Tagliabue, "U.S. Seeks Aid for Yugoslavia," New
York Times
,
December 8, 1982, p. 22.
80john Tagliabue, "Yugoslavia in Talks on Debt Assis-
tance," New York Times, January 18, 1983, p. 30.
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percent, decline in overall expenditures of at least 10 per-
cent, and decrease in standard of living by 10-12 percent. 81
At the same time, industrial production rose by two
percent and agricultural production rose 2.5 percent. This
growth, however, was directed into export markets in an ef-
fort to acquire hard currency with which to repay Yugoslav
debts; yery little, if any, growth occurred in domestic con-
sumption. A nine percent increase in export trade is expec-
ted in 1983. 82
Yugoslavia's heavy reliance on exports to stabilize
its economy met with serious problems in the initial stages
of this austerity program. The European Community (Common
Market) had many trade barriers which excluded Yugoslav ex-
port products, or, at a minimum, severely limited the volume
of products that would be accepted.
As a consequence, Yugoslavia was forced to increase
its trade with the Soviet Union and Communist bloc countries.
Trade with the Soviet Union grew to almost one-third of all
Yugoslav trade in 1982, displacing West Germany and Italy as
Yugoslavia's top trading partners. In large measure, this
increase reflects the fact that the Soviet Union supplies ap-
proximately half of Yugoslavia's oil needs. Nevertheless,
without a corresponding growth in Western trade to offset it,
81
"Yugoslavia Plans Austerity Move, " New York Times
,
Jan-
uary 9, 1983, p. 5.
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this expansion of its trade relations with the Soviet Union
represents, in the Yugoslav perspective on foreign affairs,
an undesirable form of dependence .83
To avert what appears to be the logical consequence
of such dependence--a gradual, but definite, move to return
to an alliance with the Soviet Union--Yugosl avia needs to
balance its Soviet and Western European trade. Toward this
end, Yugoslavia made repeated efforts in 1982 to persuade
the European Community to relax some of its trade barriers.
These efforts proved to be successful; and on April 1, 1983,
a new trade agreement between the European Community and Yu-
goslavia was announced. This agreement guarantees Yugoslavia
"substantial concessions on its exports and access to the Eu-
ropean Investment Bank. Commercial bank creditors agreed on
a $4 billion rescue package. "84
This action reflects the confidence of Western gov-
ernments and economic institutions in Yugoslavia's ability to
overcome its current economic difficulties. Continued assis-
tance from the West will be required for at least two years;
but at issue is the value to the West of Yugoslavia's con-
tinued independence within the socialist world and the degree
to which the West is willing to assist in assuring it.
8 3 Eric Bourne, "Yugoslavia's Economic Troubles Push It
Reluctantly Toward Soviets," Christian Science Monitor
,
April
5, 1983, p. 7.
S^ibid.
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D. SOCIALIST EXPERIENCE AND DEVELOPMENT IN EASTERN EUROPEAN
COUNTRIES
Introduction of socialist practices in the countries of
Eastern Europe has produced, short of war, the most signifi-
cant economic, political, and societal upheaval in history.
In some countries, Soviet military occupation forces imposed,
literally overnight, the changes. In others, Soviet support
to Communist party leaders in the government or guerrilla
factions ensured their eventual success. It is, therefore,
not surprising that each count ry ' s early socialist experience
conformed to the Soviet pattern.
In the almost four decades of Communist rule and social-
ist practice in Eastern Europe, each country has deviated to
some extent from the Soviet model and placed its own unique
stamp on the face of socialism. Monolithic Communism in the
region, if it ever really existed, is no longer. The degree
of loyalty and obedience to the Soviet party line now varies,
from virtual subservience in the case of Bulgaria to Hungar-
ian economic experimentation to Romania's apparent political
recalcitrance and independent actions, which are discussed
in the following section.
Its position as "the first among equals," however, en-
sures the Soviet Union's continuing influence on the affairs
of its allies. Ideological pronouncements in Moscow affect
political decisions and economic developments in each of the
bloc countries.
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IV. BASIC FEATURES OF THE ROMANIAN ECONOMY
A. IDEOLOGICAL CHARACTERIZATION
The creation and initial growth of socialism in Romania
relied very heavily on the Soviet economic model and official
ideology. Soviet pronouncements on Marxist-Leninist theory
laid the foundation for development of the socialist system
in Romania, as well as for that in other countries of Eastern
Europe.
In 1967, the official Soviet ideology of socialism under-
went a significant change. In a major speech during the cel-
ebration marking the fiftieth anniversary of the October
Revolution, Soviet Premier Brezhnev introduced a new term,
developed socialism
,
8 5 to the socialist lexicon. By 1971,
this new concept had become an explicit component of Soviet
85»oeveloped Socialism" is a qualitative distinction de-
noting the highest level of growth within the socialism phase
of transition from capitalism to communism. It represents a
more mature stage of evolution than "basic socialism," which,
in turn, is more advanced than the "building socialism"
stage; but it is still a long way from communism. The dis-
tinguishing characteristics of "developed socialism" are a
technologically advanced industrial infrastructure, which
operates at peak efficiency to meet the needs of the popula-
tion; a highly-trained, highly-skilled population, which
displays a high degree of cultural integration and social
unity; and a "perfected" state, which performs its functions
of planning, administering, and directing economic, social,
and political affairs efficiently and effectively. The most
dynamic features of "developed socialism" are economic and
technol ogical .
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thought. Arthur Evans, in an article that traces the use of
the new terminology in Soviet speeches and press reports,
suggests that the concept of developed socialism is Brezh-
nev's contribution to Marxism-Leninism. As such, its wide-
spread acceptance signified Brezhnev's emergence as the most
dominant figure in Soviet politics. 86
Apart from its impact on Soviet domestic politics, the
concept of developed socialism serves a far-reaching purpose
for socialist ideologists. It is a means of explaining the
contradictions between the realities of life in socialist
states and the Utopian promises of Communism. 87
The basic characteristics of developed socialism are a
shift in the amount of emphasis on economic criteria and re-
defined expectations for social and political transformation.
Although portrayed as logical outgrowths of traditional ide-
ology, these characteristics represent significant departures
from socialist practice.
The shift in economic emphasis is evident in the new pat-
tern of resource allocation. Historically, the Soviet econo-
my has concentrated captital investment in heavy industry on
the premise that a high rate of growth in this sector would
8*>Arthur B. Evans, "Developed Socialism in Soviet Ideo-
logy," Soviet Studies (Glasgow), Volume 29, Number 3, July
1977, p. 41b.
87 Daniel N. Nelson, "Worker-Party Conflict in Romania,"
Problems of Communism, Volume 30, Number 5, September-October
1981, p. 40.
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facilitate the transition to Communism. The new approach
stresses a balanced distribution of resources to consumption,
defense, and growth. 88
The new outlook on social transformation does not com-
pletely reject the fundamental principle of a classless soci-
ety, but it suggests postponing its realization. The main
criterion for social relations in developed socialism is a
high degree of social unity--the complete elimination of
class distinctions will occur at some point in the distant
future. 89
The most blatant departure of developed socialism from
traditional Marxist-Leninist theory relates to transformation
in political realities. Soviet ideologists now argue that
the state should not wither away, but should remain a durable
institution. It will play a major, even dominant, role in
administrative functions. 90
Beyond its utility as a theoretical construct, developed
socialism is a distinct stage in the evolution toward Commun-
ism. The ultimate objective of this stage is to build on the
foundations of basic socialism to ensure that all prerequi-
sites for a Communist society are achieved. The process is
expected to be prolonged and deliberate.
88 Evans, p. 418.
89 Ibid., p. 420.
90 Ibid., p. 423.
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Developed socialism is the highest currently defined le-
vel of socialism. To date, only the Soviet Union has claimed
to have achieved this stage. The socialist states of Eastern
Europe have not challenged the Soviet claim to a more mature
level of socialist development and each has announced offi-
cial intentions of pursuing this goal. 9 *
At its 11th Party Congress in 1974, the Romanian Commun-
ist Party adopted economic and social development guidelines
which set 1990 as the target date for becoming a developed
socialist state. 92 However, Romania prefers to be depicted
as a developing socialist economy. Such classification pro-
vides two important benefits for the Romanian government:
first, it justifies the Romanian desire for closer links with
other "developing" countries (which serves as a political
counter-weight to links with the Soviet Union and other War-
saw Pact allies), and second, it has distinct economic advan-
tages for the country.
In 1971, the European Community (EC) announced its inten-
tions to support economic development in the Third World. A
measure of this support was the extension of preferential
treatment for imports to the EC from developing countries.
9 *Evans, p. 417.
^ Programme of the Romanian Communist Party for the
Building of the Mul ti
1
aterally-Deyel oped Society and Roma
nia's Advance Toward Communism
, ( Bucharest: Men' diane
Publishing House, 1975), p. 73.
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In 1972, Romania requested and was granted trade preference
for its exports to the EC.
Also in 1972, Romania asked the United Nations to support
its request for membership in the Group of 77, the organiza-
tion of developing countries. By becoming a member of this
group, Romania hoped to gain the trade benefits offered to
developing countries by the industrial nations. 93 Romania's
campaign for inclusion in this group was successful in 1976,
when the ministerial meeting of the Group of 77 granted it
full membershi p. 94
The importance that Romania attaches to its status as a
developing country is illustrated in two interviews that
President Ceausescu granted to reporters in 1973. In the
first, with a group of West German reporters, Ceausescu was
asked to comment on the high economic development rate that
Romania had achieved and how it would maintain that rate in
the future. In response, he reiterated the Romanian claim
to developing country status:
Romania has succeeded in increasing industrial
output at a rate of some 14 per cent in the last
20 years. This rate must, however, be compared to
the low rate our country has started from. Although
having achieved this high rate, Romania is still a
developing country. Therefore the Tenth Congress
93 Robert R. King, "Romania and the Third World," Orbis ,
Volume 21, Number 4, Winter 1978, pp. 879-880.
94
"Scinteia Announces 'Group of 77' Membership," East Eu -
ropean Foreign Broadcast Information Service
,
Volume 2, Num-
ber 028, February 10, 1976, p. H4.
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and the National Conference of the Party set the
target of a continued high development rate for the
next 10-15 years so that we catch up or come close
to the level of the economically developed countries.
We continue to earmark some 30-33 per cent of
the national income for development. We must make
this effort because only in this way we shall ensure
the fast development of the whole economy. The
building of the mul ti
1
aterally developed socialist
society we have set ourselves will only be achieved
on the groundwork of a strong economy.^
In the second interview, granted to a Sudanese reporter,
Ceausescu's claim to developing country status for Romania
was specifically questioned. The reporter asked him to ex-
plain his reasons for such categorization, in light of "bril-
liant successes in economic development." In response, Ceau-
sescu described the development of socialism in Romania by
citing four examples of Romanian accomplishments.
First, according to Ceausescu, at the time that Romania
began building socialism, it had a yery low level of develop-
ment. More than 75 percent of the population was active in
agriculture. By concentrating efforts on industrialization,
Romania was able to achieve a 25-fold increase in industrial
output in 1973 over that of 1938, the year of peak output in
the past. The comparative figures he cited for steel produc-
tion alone illustrate this point, 280,000 tons in 1938 versus
^^Nicolae Ceausescu, "Interview Granted to a Group of
Journalists from the Federal Republic of Germany, June 15,
1973," Romania: On the Way of Building Up the Mul ti
1
ateral -
ly Developed Socialist Society
,
Reports, Speeches, Articles,
January 19/3 -July 1973, (Bucharest: Meridiane Publishing
House, 1973), pp. 528-529.
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8 million tons in 1973. He also cited a corresponding dif-
ference in electric power production, with 1.1 thousand mil-
lion kilowatt-hours produced in 1938 and 48 thousand million
in 1973. He used these figures to illustrate the tempo and
scope of industrial growth in Romania under socialism.
Second, Ceausescu pointed out that in agriculture Romania
concentrated on creating cooperatives, improving mechaniza-
tion, and introducing chemicals and modern agricultural sci-
ence to the system. The process of cooperati vi zation proved
to require considerable effort and time, and it was only com-
pleted in 1962. Ceausescu emphasized that although the pro-
cess of collectivization took longer in Romania than in some
other Eastern European countries, the government is proud of
the resultant growth in agricultural output. As an example,
the average output of wheat rose from 7-800 kilograms per
hectare to 3400 kilograms per hectare in Constanta County.
He then stated that the government considers the integration
of agricultural needs and industrial production an even more
important accomplishment. When socialism was introduced in
Romania in 1948, all of the tractors operating in Romanian
agriculture were imports; today, domestic production of heavy
machinery has eliminated the need to import agricultural ma-
chines. Romania is, in fact, an exporter of such equipment.
Third, Ceausescu mentioned the Romanian government's spe-
cial emphasis on education and training. It has established
a system of compulsory education for a minimum of ten years,
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and it encourages talented students to continue with second-
ary and higher education. At the same time, however, it also
has demonstrated particular interest in practical training in
all spheres of activity to assure a skilled labor pool for
further economic development.
Fourth, Ceausescu stated that the emphasis on scientific
and cultural developments has enabled Romanians to raise the
national income and their standard of living. He stressed
that these two areas of development are prerequisites for so-
cialist construction.
After speaking of the successes of the Romanian experi-
ence, Ceausescu then specifically addressed the question of
Romania's status as a developing country in this manner:
Why do I nevertheless consider that Romania is
a developing country? Because in spite of all our
remarkable results, a quite long distance still se-
parates us from the economically advanced countries.
It is true that the socialist system is superior,
but we cannot ignore the fact that the material
groundwork is still low. That is why we have
planned to practically do away with this gap in the
ensuing 10-15 years, and to approximate the ad-
vanced countries, from the point of view of econo-
mic development. The industrial rate of growth in
the first two and a half years of the current Five-
Year Plan is about 12 per cent, and of 14.5 per
cent in the first half of this year, a fact which
entitles us to assert that we will be able to fill
the gap in the above-mentioned period. 96
^Nicolae Ceausescu, "Interview Granted to the Sudanese
Daily 'El Sahafa', July 27, 1973," Romania: On the Way of
Building Up the Mul ti
1
ateral ly Developed Socialist Society
Reports, Speeches, Articles, January 19/3-July 19/3, (Bucha-
rest: Meridiane Publishing House, 1973), p. 726.
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As important as the designation of developing country is
to Romania economically and politically, it provides two
other benefits that perhaps overshadow its economic value in
terms of foreign trade. By using the argument of the need to
reinvest substantial proportions of its national income in
development, Romania is able to resist increases in Warsaw
Treaty Organization defense obligations and to justify more
intense extra-bloc trade ties than other Eastern European
bloc states. It also provides domestic justification for
government demands for more and greater sacrifices to further
economic growth. 97
B. STRUCTURE OF THE ROMANIAN ECONOMY
1 . Agricultural Versus Industrial Emphasis
Before World War II, Romania had a predominantly
agrarian economy. Approximately three-fourths of the popula-
tion lived in rural areas and worked in the agricultural sec-
tor. Industrial development was mainly associated with the
production of raw materials for export. In 1938, the peak
year of the pre-war Romanian economy, industrial employment
accounted for only eight percent of the total work force. 9 ^
The situation in the immediate postwar years was even worse,
in part because the Soviets had confiscated the bulk of the
97 Nelson, p. 43.
9
^Tsantis and Pepper, p. 1.
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Romanian industrial equipment as well as entire production
plants as war retributions. In 1948, "the potential of Ro-
manian industry reached only half the pre-war levels in cer-
tain branches." 99
Contrast with the Romanian economy today is striking.
Less than thirty percent of the population is now employed in
in the agricultural sectoi— a 45 percent change in the demo-
graphy of the labor force. By way of comparison, only 35
percent of the Soviet population was involved in agriculture
in 1959; over the following 20 years, the number dropped to
23 percent, representing only a 12 percent shift in the labor
force. 100
Population shifts to urban areas and industrial em-
ployment account for almost half of the Romanian labor pool.
It is worth noting, however, that during the period of trans-
fer of such a large segment of the population from rural pop-
ulation to non-agricultural sectors, farm output continued to
rise. The rate of increase in productivity for the 1971-75
Five-Year Plan was three times that of the previous plan. 101
99Leonte Tismaneanu and Rolica Zaharia, Present and Pros -
ect in Romania's Social and Economic Development
,
trans-
ated by Andrei Bantas, (Bucharest: Meri di ane Publishing
House, 1977), p. 85.
f
100Alex Pravda, "Is There a Soviet Working Class?" Prob -
lems of Communism
,
Volume 31, Number 6, November-December
1982, p. 4.
101 Tismaneanu and Zaharia, p. 127.
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Although agriculture is still a major component of
the Romanian economy, the real growth under socialism resul-
ted from efforts to expand the industrial base. Not only did
the existing extractive industries increase their output, but
a broader spectrum of products began to appear in Romania.
Romania--a country which before the Second World
War used to import all machinery and equipment
almost without exception, now produces power gen-
erators..., drilling installations..., vessels of
up to 55,000 tons dwt, automation installations,
administrative and process electronic computers,
complex technological plant for the chemical, me-
tallurgical, mining and building materials indus-
tries, etc. Particular scope has also been
assumed by the industries building motorcars,
motor buses and trucks, high capacity tractors,
farming machinery, Diesel and electric locomotives,
aircraft and helicopters, as well as installations
for the food industry. ioZ
This change in economic emphasis is demonstrated by
the dramatic shift in the types of products that Romania ex-
ports. Virtually all of Romania's foreign trade prior to
World War II consisted of unprocessed agricultural and wood
products and petroleum. By 1975, this pattern of foreign
trade had been completely modified. Today industrial goods
constitute 55 percent of Romanian exports. *03
To put these data in perspective, it is important to
realize that the Romanian definition of industry is unusually
broad. It includes all of the following economic activities:
lO^xismaneanu and Zaharia, pp. 102-103.
lO^Tsanfjs and Pepper, p. 9. For trade data, see Appen-
dix B; graphic displays of the economy are in Appendix C.
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extraction of fuel and mineral resources; all functions as-
sociated with thermoelectric and hydroelectric energy except
for the distribution accomplished by public utility enterpri-
ses; processing of raw materials, except for that conducted
in private homes; repairs of machinery, equipment, and consu-
mer goods; and cold storage plants.^- 04
2 . Formal Structure of the Romanian Economy: Organiza -
tions Involved in Economic Functions
The formal structure of the Romanian economy adheres
strictly to the fundamental socialist principle of central -
planning and control of economic development. Official or-
ganizational structure for administration of the economy and
the social institutions affected by it are drawn directly
from the basic theoretical model of socialism.
The most important organization in economic matters,
as well as in all other matters in Romania, is the Romanian
Communist Party (RCP). Officially, the RCP holds its Party
Congress every five years and determines the overall direc-
tion in which the economic development should proceed for the
next five years. It then issues the directives that become
guidelines for planning.
According to the Romanian Constitution, the Grand Na-
tional Assembly is the parliamentary body which adopts the
laws governing economic activity. Its permanent commissions
104Tsantis and Pepper, p. 191
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provide advice on pertinent legislation. It elects the State
Council, which is responsible for the administration of all
1 aws
.
The Supreme Council of Economic and Social Develop-
ment is the officially designated chief advisory and deliber-
ative agency in the planning field. It consists of 150 to
260 members who represent all aspects of Romanian economic
and social life.
Of the 57 positions on the Council of Ministers, 39
are directly related to economic matters. As the highest
body of state administration, the Council of Ministers is
formally responsible for managing all economic and social ac-
tivities in the count ry.
The State Planning Committee is the agency that is
officially responsible for drafting annual and five-year eco-
nomic plans and overseeing their implementation. It coordi-
nates Romanian economic plans with the Council for Mutual
Economic Assistance.
For each major sector of the economy, the formal eco-
nomic structure provides a Technical Ministry responsible for
planning. The Centrals are independent units subordinate to
the ministries that assist in administration of the enterpri-
ses, the lowest level of official economic organization. En-
terprises are the units which execute the plans. They are
responsible for production and distribution of goods, as well
as oversight of trade and services.
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The Agencies for Economic Synthesis are officially
designated, national -1 evel organizations that deal with the
aspects of the economy which pertain to all sectors, such as
finance, labor, and statistics. *05
The formal structure of the Romanian economy desig-
nates those organizations and agencies which are responsible
for development and implementation of economic plans. Theo-
retically, the functions , relationships, and responsibilities
defined within this structure ensure that the economic plans
are products of coordinated effort and reflect the needs and
desires of the population as well as the economic potential
of the country.
In practice, however, this elaborate apparatus does
not control the economic sphere of activity. It is not even
the most influential factor in economic affairs. Party and
state leaders make all the decisions of any consequence--the
general direction that economic development should take; the
sectors to receive particular emphasis, to be restricted in
growth, or to be allowed to drift at established levels of
production; and the laws that need to be effected. The com-
ponents of the formal structure legitimize these decisions
through unanimous approval at the Party Congresses and the
subsequent dissemination of policy statements to support the
deci sions .
iOSjsantis and Pepper, pp. 39-42
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3 . Composition and Distribution of the Work Force
In 1978, the last year for which complete figures are
available, Romania had a population of 21.8 million. The
working age population, consisting of males from 16 to 64
years of age and females from 16 to 59 years of age, was 12.4
million, or 56.6 percent of the population. The occupied po-
pulation^^ numbered 10.3 million, or 47 percent of the popu-
lation.
The following distribution of employment among the
economic sectors existed in 1978: agriculture and forestry,
3.5 million, or 33.7 percent; industry and construction, 4.3
million, or 42 percent; other "productive" sectors, including
trade, transportation, and communications, 1.3 million, or
12.3 percent; and "non-productive" sectors, such as housing,
education, health, and administration, 1.2 million, or 12
percent.
Seven million people, 67.7 percent of the occupied
population, were employed in state or cooperative enterprises
excluding agriculture. Females accounted for 36.2 percent of
this group.
Members of agricultural cooperatives and privately
employed persons are categorized as non-employees in Romanian
records. This group constituted 32.3 percent of the labor
106''0ccupied population" is that portion of the popula
tion actively employed in all sectors of the economy, exclud
ing job seekers and military trainees.
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force, with 3.3 million on agricultural cooperatives and
four hundred thousand in private empl oyment . ^7
4. Trade Relations
Romania's policy on trade is driven, in large part,
by the need for raw materials and investment goods to sustain
industrial growth. In order to meet this need, Romania main-
tains a range of relationships: with the other socialist
countries, with developed market economies, and with develop-
ing nations.
An example of the diversity of Romania's trade poli-
cy is its membership in international economic organizations.
Romania was one of the original members of the Council for
Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA) in 1949. As an expression
of opposition to the Soviet attempt to create a supranational
organization of the socialist countries in 1964, Romania did
not join the CMEA's International Bank for Economic Coopera-
tion (IBEC) when it was established. However, production
problems and the need for credit assistance prompted Romania
to reconsider that decision. Romania did join IBEC in 1971,
but only after much negotiation. The result of the negotia-
ting sessions was a change in IBEC's constitution, guarantee-
ing equal rights and sovereignty of each member nation. *°8
lO^Marvin R. Jackson, "Perspectives on Romania's Economic
Development in the 1980s," in Romania in the 1980s , ed. Dan-
iel N. Nelson, (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1981 ), p. 257.
108 Sharp, p. 93.
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In 1973, Romania became the first CMEA member to join
the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Yugoslavia, the only
other socialist member of the IMF, has observer status but is
not a CMEA member. Romania also joined the World Bank; it is
an active participant in the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade (GATT); it belongs to the United Nations Committee on
Trade and Development (UNCTAD) and the International Bank for
Reconstruction and Development (IRBD).
The Soviet Union remains Romania's largest single
trading partner, but total Romanian trade within the CMEA is
significantly less than the 1960 figure of 67 percent. The
latest Romanian figures, based on 1979 statistics, indicate
the following distribution of trade:
CMEA (Albania, Bulgaria, Cuba,
Czechoslovakia, East Germany,
Hungary, Poland, Soviet Union)
Communist Countries (CMEA, China,
North Korea, Vietnam, Yugoslavia)
Developed Market Economies (Austria,
Belgium, Canada, France, Germany,
Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Sweden,
Switzerland, United Kingdom,
United States)
Developing Countries (Algeria, Argen-
tina, Brazil, Egypt, Greece,
India, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Jordan,







^-^International Trade Admini stration , U.S. Department of
Commerce, Foreign Economic Trends and Their Implications for
the United 5tates--Romani a
, ( Bucharest: American Embassy ,
July 1981, p~I 8" a7T3 TTantis and Pepper, pp. 574-577.
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Categorization of Greece, Portugal, Spain, and Tur-
key as "developing countries," based on economic output and
standards of living, is technically justifiable. More impor-
tantly, however, it permits Romanian economic officials to
mask the true extent of trade relationships with the West.
A particularly interesting feature of Romanian trade
relations is the joint ventures for technical and scientific
exchange and cooperative production. The first type of joint
venture involves primarily geologic exploration and construc-
tion of industrial units in other countries. Such projects
provide access to raw materials as well as markets for Roma-
nian products. Although most efforts have been concentrated
in the Middle East and Africa, some have been made with West-
ern Europe.
The second type of joint venture involves foreign ca-
pital investment in Romanian production companies. This type
of project benefits Romania by providing new production lines
and upgrading existing lines. It also contributes to dissem-
ination of technical and organizational knowledge through the
training programs in the plants. HO
Approximately 120 joint ventures of this type cur-
rently exist. The following three examples, in each case the
first concluded with the country specified, illustrate the
broad scope of products involved: Italy has a joint venture
110 Tsantis and Pepper, pp. 125-127
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with Romania to make acrylic fiber yarns; Germany is a part-
ner in a venture to make ship gears; and an American company,
Control Data Corporation, is a minority partner in an elec-
tronics firm that manufactures printers, card punchers, and
other computer peripheral s .
m
C. ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT UNDER THE COMMUNIST REGIME
Throughout most of its history, Romania has been one of
the least developed countries in Europe. As recently as
World War II, it had a traditional agrarian economy and life-
style. The vast majority of the population, upwards of 75
percent, lived in rural communities. Despite the amount of
manpower devoted to agriculture, the population existed near
the subsistence level. Only minor industrial development,
primarily in forestry and oil production, had occurred. It
employed only eight percent of the labor force.
The effects of World War II on the Romanian economy--the
destruction of property, depletion of manpower, and disrup-
tion of the system--are understandable. The aftermath of the
war, however, could not have been predicted and was even more
disastrous. Romania's economic recovery was prevented for
the next five years by the actions of the Soviet Union.
World War II had devastated the Soviet Union. Its econ-
omy, which could not have been considered highly developed
Hljohn Pearson, "Inside Romania: East Europe's Pace
setter," Business Week, December 1, 1973, pp. 40-41.
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before the war, was completely shattered. To overcome its
severe economic problems, the Soviet Union began to use its
new position as a world power to rebuild its economy at the
expense of the countries under its domination. Stalin's po-
licy toward the Eastern European countries was directed to-
ward extracting from them, at the least cost, everything that
could possibly be of any value to the Soviet Union. Although
this policy had extremely damaging effects on the economies
of the entire region, Romania, by any standard, suffered the
most.
Although, at the end of the war, Romania switched to the
Allied side, the Soviets chose to focus on its earlier alli-
ance with Germany and treated Romania as a conquered enemy.
This attitude "legitimized" the first two of the four dis-
tinct forms of economic exploitation to which the Soviet Un-
ion subjected Romania in the immediate postwar years.
First, the Soviet Union exercised the traditional prac-
tice of victorious powers--pi 1
1
agi ng the land of the beaten
enemy. In the case of Romania, however, the Soviet Union far
exceeded any previous concept of "war booty." The entire Ro-
manian navy, vast quantities of equipment from the oil indus-
try, and half the rolling stock of Romania's railways were
conf i seated. I 12
112 David Floyd, Ruman i a : j*uss i a ' s Pis si den t Ally , (New
York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1965 ) , pp . 33-34 .
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Second, as a conquered nation, Romania was required to
pay war reparations to its conquerer, the Soviet Union. This
payment occurred in the form of capital goods, particularly
oil, timber, and grain. Under this policy, "capital goods
valued at some $2,000,000,000 were removed by 1948. ull 3 i n
addition, Romania had to pay for the cost of supporting the
Soviet occupation forces on Romanian soil during this time.
Third, to take advantage of Romanian property that could
not be physically removed from the country, the Soviet Union
instituted a series of joint Soviet-Romanian companies to
manage industries. "Sovrom" companies, which gave the Soviet
Union complete control over output, "became the symbols of
Soviet economic exploitation of satellite economies ." H*
Joint companies were set up to handle every possible sector
of the Romanian economy--f rom transportation to banking, from
oil production to the building industry. "In effect, the
joint company turned the main branches of Rumanian industry
into appendages of the Soviet economy. "115
Fourth, a series of trade agreements provided for supply
of Soviet raw materials and equipment to Romania in return
for their manufactured goods. These agreements effectively
H^Charles and Barbara Jelavich, eds., The Balkans in
Transition
,
(Berkely, CA: University of C a 1 i f o r n i a Press ,
1963), p. 162.
H 4 Floyd, p. 32.
ll 5 Ibid., p. 33.
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eliminated any possibility for Romanian trade with countries
other than the Soviet Union and the Soviet bloc of Eastern
Europe .
The exploitation of the Romanian economy by the Soviet
Union in the immediate postwar period was directed predomi-
nantly against Romania's limited industrial component. Chan-
ges were, however, occurring in the agricultural sector in
this same time frame.
The first change was a result of the land reform measure
enacted in 1945. This program expropriated, without compen-
sation, all private holdings of land over 50 hectares in size
and redistributed the property to poor peasants. "The de-
clared aim of this measure was to increase the size of exist-
ing dwarf farms to five hectares, and to create new farms of
that size. Another major purpose of this measure was to re-
duce the opposition of the peasants to Communi sm. "116 To
this end, this expropriation of property was not accompanied
by persecution of the owners. H7
Subsequent change differed significantly. There was no
attempt to legitimize government actions in order to preclude
peasant opposition. "After a short interlude of wooing the
H^Robert F. Byrnes, gen. ed., East Central Europe Under
the Communi sts
,
(New York: Frederick A~T Praeger , Atlantic
Books, 19b/), Romania ed. by Stephen Fi scher-Gal ati
,
p. 202.
H^Ghita Ionescu, Communi sm in Rumania 1944-1962
,
(New
York: Oxford University Press, 1964), pp. 191-193.
92
peasantry with promises and the 1945 land redistribution, the
government began .. .col 1 ecti vization ." *18 a new land reform
law was passed in March 1949. This time, the government ex-
propriated all property over 50 hectares, including land held
by government agencies, crown lands, church estates, land be-
longing to institutions, and certain categories of large pea-
sant farms. This time, persecution of the owners was common,
with evictions and deportation to unknown destinations the
norm. There was no effort to redistribute the land under the
new land reform. It was immediately turned into collective
farms. By the end of the year, 56 collectives had come into
exi stence. ^^
The establishment of the Socialist Republic in 1948 co-
incided with the loosening of the Soviet stranglehold on Ro-
mania and initiated a major transformation of the country's
economy. The new regime established one-year economic plans
in 1949 and 1950, following the Soviet example of central
planning, which emphasized industrialization and improved ag-
ricultural production. It set out to achieve its objectives
through capital investment in industry and collectivization
of agriculture. Through a series of Five-Year Plans for de-
velopment, Romania converted a country with a predominantly
agrarian, traditional economy, ravaged by an exploitative




Soviet policy for five years, into a modern, industrialized
state in less than three decades.
1. 1951-1955 Five-Year Plan
The first attempt at central planning in Romania pro-
duced a plan of all-round development and industrialization.
It placed great emphasis on the machine building industry,
since this sector would produce the equipment necessary for
improvements in other industries. The plan also called for
a 57 percent increase in the productivity of labor. It iden-
tified ten principal commodities for which production targets
were established: crude oil, coal, natural gas, cement, lum-
ber, electric power, steel, pig iron, iron ore, and rolled
steel . 120
The period of the first industrialization drive rea-
lized a high measure of success until 1953. Investment more
than doubled and industrial output rose by almost 70 percent.
Progress in this period illustrated the interdependence of
sectors, the importance of foreign trade, and the priorities
of industrialization policy. This rapid growth could not be
sustained, because the growth in export goods could not meet
requirements for both internal needs and exports. In addi-
tion, the pace of industrialization created imbalances in
other sectors of the economy. Consumer goods industries re-
ceived little investment. Collectivization of agriculture
120 Ionescu, pp. 191-193.
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occurred fi tful ly--at times, forced collectivization was the
rule; at others, consolidation of existing collectives was
emphasized. Throughout the period, agricultural production
slowed. Urban housing did not keep pace with the need, and
migrations to towns slackened. 121
2 • ] 95 6-1 960 F ive-Year Plan
The second five-year plan reflected the Council for
Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA) attempt to harmonize plan-
ning efforts in Eastern Europe. Romania's contribution to
this effort was to specialize in oil, methane, gas, cellu-
lose, timber, the chemical industry, and specific equipment
such as tractors and trucks.* 22 Production targets for these
items were less ambitious than had been the case in the ini-
tial plan. Efforts to collectivize the farms, begun under
the first plan, were to continue. These included incentives
to the farmers to join cooperatives and reductions in quotas
for cereal production.
Machine building and chemicals maintained their high
rates of growth. The annual rate of growth in the socialist
sector dropped to less than three percent compared with ten
percent under the first plan. The resultant decrease in the
rate of urbanization helped to ease the housing shortage. 123
121 Tsantis and Pepper, p. 460.
122 Ionescu, p. 251.
123 Tsantis and Pepper, p. 461.
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3. 1 961-1 965 Five-Year Plan
Developments in the economic interrelationships of
Soviet-bloc countries, within the context of the CMEA, had a
significant effect on the direction of Romania's 1961-1965
Five-Year Plan. In the mid-1950's, the CMEA began to evolve
from a relatively ineffective organization concerned only
with commercial relations to one whose purpose was to plan
and direct the economic activity of the entire bloc. The
concept of a "socialist division of labor on an international
scale," which would coordinate economic plans, make the re-
gion self-sufficient, and avoid duplication of production ef-
fort, began to form.
Eventual elaboration of this concept was Khrushchev's
1962 proposal for a supranational organization in which each
country would concentrate only on the economic sectors in
which it already excelled or had the best resources. This
meant that Romania and Bulgaria would emphasize agricultural
production and the extractive industries. They would provide
these primary goods to the industries in other countries for
processing into manufactured goods. The Romanian leadership
correctly perceived this proposal as an attempt to prevent
the country's industrialization and devel opment. 124
The Romanian government, then headed by President
Gheorghi Gheorghiu-Dej , maintained that economic planning is
124Tsantis and Pepper, p. 461
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a national prerogative and refused to relinquish any part of
Romanian sovereignty over its economic policy. Romanian ob-
jections were sufficiently strong to defeat the proposed mul-
tilateral central planning unit in CMEA in 1963.
This conflict over the economic sovereignty issue was
the first open defiance of Soviet policy in the CMEA forum by
a bloc country. It was a foretaste of the independent econo-
mic and political actions which have since become the trade
mark of Romanian foreign policy. The Soviet-Chinese rift in
the 1960's provided the appropriate political climate for Ro-
manian challenges to Soviet policies to succeed.
In April 1964 the Romanian Central Committee
issued a statement which has been described as a
'Declaration of Independence' in economic as well
as political matters. In the economic area, they
asserted the right to develop their own natural
resources. In political affairs they rejected the
idea that any communist party was superior to ano-
ther, claiming the right of each party to develop
its own policies. *2
5
Romanian President Gheorghiu-Dej refused to take
sides in the Sino-Soviet dispute and maintained relations
with China, as well as with Albania and Yugoslavia, two other
socialist countries in Soviet disfavor. Such actions suppor-
ted references to Romania as the maverick of the Soviet bloc.
When Nicolae Ceausescu assumed leadership of Romania
in 1965, after the death of Gheorghiu-Dej, he continued to
follow the independent policy. Romania was the first country
125 Sharp, pp. 92-93.
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in Eastern Europe to establish diplomatic relations with West
Germany; it refused to support Soviet and Eastern European
denunciations of Israel after the 1967 Arab-Israeli war; it
maintained diplomatic relations with Israel after the 1973
Mid-East conflict; it supported the Dubcek regime in Czecho-
slovakia and refused to participate in Warsaw Pact interven-
vention in that country in 1968; it was the only bloc country
that condemned the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979; it
advocates dissolution of the North Atlantic Treaty Organiza-
tion (NATO) and the Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO) or War-
saw Pact (WP); it supports a Balkan Nuclear Free Zone; and it
is the only bloc country that calls for reduction of nuclear
weapons by both superpowers.
Independent Romanian policy extends to its military
relationship within the Warsaw Pact as well. The last Soviet
occupation troops pulled out of Romania in 1959. Since that
time, no Soviet troops have been permitted on Romanian soil.
No Warsaw Pact exercises are conducted in Romania, and Roma-
nian forces do not participate in exercises in other WP coun-
tries. In addition, Ceausescu unilaterally reduced Romanian
contributions to the Warsaw Pact, arguing that Romania's "de-
veloping" economy could not support the expenditure.
Independent economic policy involves increased rela-
tions with the West. Typical examples are trade agreements
with the European Community, joint production ventures, and
International Monetary Fund membership.
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All of these independent actions, to some extent,
stem from the success of Romanian opposition to the 1962 So-
viet proposal to create a supranational central planning unit
within CMEA.
Perhaps because the Romanians sensed this trend in
the late 1950's, a goal of the third five-year plan was to
reduce Romanian economic dependence on the Soviet Union and
the more developed countries of Eastern Europe. This goal
was to be achieved through creation of an expanded industrial
base supported by its own resources. Investment in agricul-
ture was to be increased to finance collectivization and to
build up the productive capacity of the state farms.
Economic growth during this period was rapid. Indus-
try met most of its targets. Agriculture was fully collec-
tivized in 1962. Foreign trade was in balance through 1961.
Once again, agricultural production lagged behind the
rest of the economy in growth rate. It remained at only two
percent per year through 1965. A poor harvest in 1961-62 re-
duced available exports, which in turn resulted in a slower
rate of investment in agriculture from foreign trade. Real-
location of food and consumer goods to external markets were
major factors which prevented attainment of planned targets
for growth in the consumer sector. This resulted in an over-
all decline in the standard of living. 126
12
^Tsantis and Pepper, pp. 462-463.
99
Ignoring the consumer sector, however, the Romanian
economy had made impressive strides during the period of the
first three five-year plans. As a result of the successful
completion of agricultural collectivization and the achieve-
ment of industrial production targets, the Romanian Communist
Party considered that the basic foundation for a drive to
Communism had been laid in the country. It believed that
stable economic growth could be maintained in the future.
Therefore, in 1965, it took the significant step of proclaim-
ing the Socialist Republic of Romania, 12 ? thereby claiming
for itself, at least in name, equality with the Soviet Union
with regard to socialist development.
4. 1966-1970 Five-Year Plan
The fourth five-year plan projected the continued
pattern of growth identified in the 1961-65 plan, but at a
lower rate. The rate of increase in gross industrial produc-
tion was to be smaller; however, growth rates in chemicals
and machine building were to be particularly high to permit
a large increase in their export. The target for growth in
consumer goods was higher than in previous plans. Gross pro-
duction in agriculture was to increase by as much as 26-32
percent compared with the previous five years. Investment
allocations were to take into consideration regional criteria
to reduce inequities in production and income.
i^Tsantis and Pepper, p. 463
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During the five-year period covered by this plan, in-
dustry and investment overfulfilled their targets; agricul-
ture and retail sales had shortfalls. Imports rose rapidly,
but exports failed to keep pace. To compensate for the re-
sultant imbalance of payments, the government reduced its
planned improvements in living standards. Even so, the for-
eign debt mounted. At the end of the five-year period, for-
eign debt stood at more than 900 million lei valuta. 128
5. 1971-1975 Five-Year Plan
Guidelines for the fifth five-year plan emphasized a
continuation of higher investment rates, the pre-eminence of
industry, greater labor productivity and economic efficiency,
and the introduction of improved technology throughout the
economy.
Once again, Romanian industrial production and in-
vestment overfulfilled planned targets, resulting in an 11.6
128Tsantis and Pepper, p. 465. Leu (plural lei ) val uta
is a term that expresses the formal gol d value of the Roma-
nian currency at any given point in time. Such a device is
necessary because the leu is not a convertible currency and
cannot be compared directly to world market values. The of-
ficial rate is used only in government foreign trade statis-
tics. It is set at 4.47 lei per dollar (US). For business
or personal transactions, the conversion rate was 18 lei per
dollar through 1980. Between 1980 and July, 1983, the leu
valuta stood at 16.5 lei per dollar. On July 25, 1983, the
leu valuta rose to 17.5 lei per dollar in commercial trans-
actions and 13.5 in non-commercial (tourist) transactions.
These rates are well above the black market rate in Romania.
Stating the hard currency debt in these terms effectively
undervalues it. What Romania can get for its exports is
considerably less than the prices the government quotes in
lei valuta.
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percent rate of growth throughout the period. Once again,
agriculture was the only major productive sector which did
not meet its planned target, and its growth was 25.4 percent
for the period.
National income increased at an average rate of 11.3
percent. Exports, which included a marked increase in indus-
trial products, grew at an annual rate of 19 percent, while
imports, heavily oriented toward industrial producer goods
and raw materials, grew by 18 percent per year. Private con-
sumption increased at an average annual rate of 8.5 percent,
reflecting the government policy that retail sales should
grow more slowly than national income. **9
6. 1976-1980 Five-Year Plan
Goals of the sixth five-year plan included improve-
ment in regional distribution of production and incomes, an
overall growth in national income of 10-11 percent per year,
internal scientific and technological development, and re-
duced consumption of energy and raw materials. Additionally,
efforts were made to improve the efficiency of production and
improve the quality of goods. *30
Between 1972 and 1978, Romania experienced a period
of sustained economic growth that resulted in the doubling of
129James Wein, "Romania's Central Planning Used to Keep
Investment Ratios and Growth Rates High," IMF Survey
,
Vol-
ume 7, Number 12, June 19, 1978, p. 188.
i^Tsantis and Pepper, p. 13.
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national income. Real gross national product increased 7.5
percent, while agricultural production grew at a rate of six
percent. 131
By 1980, this rosy picture had deteriorated. An
earthquake in Bucharest in 1977 extensively damaged most
industrial facilities in the city. This devastation was com-
pounded by a poor harvest for three consecutive years, the
rising cost of oil and raw materials, and an explosion in a
large petrochemical plant. 132
Exacerbating these problems was a record of bad man-
agement decisions. Primary among them and typical of their
effects was the emphasis on the petrochemical industry.
Although no one in Romania could have been expected
to anticipate the fall of the Shah and the resultant decline
in oil exports from Iran, Romania's decision to invest so
heavily in its oil refining industry can still be considered
a mistake. As its own oil supplies began to diminish in the
mid-1970's, Romania imported oil from the Mid-East. These
imports, for which Romania paid spot market prices, coupled
with the cost of industrial production equipment necessary to
13*East European Division, IMF European Department and
Bureau of Statistics, "Internationally Comparable Data on Ro-
mania to be Reported Regularly in New IFS Page," IMF Survey
,
Volume 9, Number 11, June 3, 1980, p. 168.
1 ^2j oanne « # Salop, "Exchange, Price Reform are Key Ele-
ments in Romania's New Stabl i
1
ization Program," IMF Survey
,
September 7, 1981, p. 262.
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process it, placed a heavy strain on the Romanian economy.
To finance this venture, Romania borrowed heavily from West-
ern banks and governments. As a result, Romanian foreign
debt rose to $10 billion in 1981. Compounding the problem,
most of the loans were short-term, which means payment for
almost all of them comes due at the same time.
Besides the foreign debt problem, three other consid-
erations demonstrate the Romanian government's poor manage-
ment in its decision to concentrate so heavily on this sector
of the economy. First, to compensate for loss of oil from
the Mid-East, which ended with the Iran-Iraq war in 1978,
Romania turned to its CMEA trading partner, the Soviet Union.
Far from getting the oil at the reduced rate the Soviet Union
charges its CMEA partners, however, Romania was required to
pay the same price for Soviet oil as it had paid for Mid-East
oil, and payment had to be in hard currency. This was not
only a harsh blow to the Romanian economy; it also makes Ro-
mania more dependent on the Soviet Union.
Second, because the price for refined petroleum prod-
ucts has not kept pace with the cost of crude oil, Romania is
running refineries at only 50 percent capacity. What was to
be a source of hard currency earnings has turned into a sym-
bol of the failure of the Romanian style of management. 133
133|_ awrence Minard, "A Balkan Despotism," Forbes
,
Volume
127, Number 10, May 11, 1981, p. 132.
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Finally, this ambitious, though ill-advised, project
with oil refining was conducted at the expense of investment
in other economic sectors, most importantly agriculture. By
steering investment away from agriculture, which realisti-
cally is the mainstay of the Romanian economy because of its
immense importance to export trade, the Romanian government
has contributed to its food import headaches . ^ 4
7. 1981-1985 Five-Year Plan
The current five-year plan has three major goals:
increased agricultural productivity, development of exports
to reduce reliance on high interest credits, and stabiliza-
tion of energy expenditures . 135 i n addition, special atten-
tion will be given to metallurgical processing equipment.
It seems doubtful that Romania is going to fulfill
the objectives of its current five-year plan. Agricultural
production has not improved; at the beginning of 1982, Ceau-
sescu admitted that the grain harvest was six million tons
below its production target. 136 j ne worldwide recession re-
duced markets for Romanian goods, even if there were suffi-
cient goods available for export. In order to export goods,
134John S. DeMott, "Now It's Cash-Strapped Romania,"
Time
, Yolume 119, Number 19, March 8, 1982, p. 84.
1^5 Edga r D. Fulton, "New Trade Policies Aim at Export De-
velopment," Business America, Volume 4, Number 15, July 27,
1981, p. 20.
136j onn Darnton, "Poles' Neighbors Fear Spread of Un-
rest," New York Times, February 22, 1982, p. 8A.
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the consumption sector would have to be reduced. At a time
of severe shortages, it would not be advisable to cut back
still further on consumer goods to supply the export market.
"Signs of economic decline are everywhere. Romanian
consumers are accustomed to demands for sacrifices in the
name of economic development, and they have long been putting
up with the lowest standard of living in the whole of Eastern
Europe. But recently things have gotten even worse. "137
With agricultural production once again below target,
food shortages have become acute. In early 1982, the govern-
ment instituted a series of price increases and rationing in
such staples as meat, sugar, cooking oil, and butter. 138 j n
October, 1981, Romania had become the first country in East-
ern Europe to ration bread. 139
The most obvious signs of economic decline are the
austerity measures in effect throughout the country to deal
with the severe energy crisis Romania is experiencing. Homes
and public buildings go without heat, electricity, and hot
water for hours each day. About two-thirds of Bucharest's
lights are out--even more outside the city. Museums and most
137-oigging In," Economist
,
Volume 278, Number 2174, Fe-
bruary 28, 1981, p. 41TI
138»More Gloom for the Rumanians: 5-Year Plan Lags,"
New York Times
,
December 19, 1982, p. 8.
13 9»a Whiff of Trouble to Come," Economist
,
Volume 281,
Number 7208, October 24, 1981, p. 37.
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tourist attractions remain completely dark unless visitors
are actually present; lights are extinguished as soon as
visitors leave. Gasoline is rationed; public transportation
has been reduced by 30 percent.
People are trapped in elevators because of rotating
power blackouts. Patients wait in the dark in hospital emer-
gency rooms. Schools extend vacations to save on classroom
utility costs. Home thermostats are set at a maximum of 65
degrees, partially because of the 20 percent cutback in elec-
tricity that occurred in 1982 and partially because the cost
of home heating has risen 200 percent in the last year.^O
All the while, in the midst of austerity, the govern-
ment exhorts the population to conserve energy even more. In
a speech at a Romanian Communist Party conference in December
1982, Ceausescu declared that "resolute action must be taken
to reduce electricity consumption by 10-15 percent. "141
The only positive sight in an otherwise bleak econo-
mic picture for Romania is the fact that the International
Monetary Fund and some Western banks have shown a willingness
to reschedule loan payments. How often or for how long they
will continue to do so is an open question. As long as Roma-
nia continues to meet its interest payments on the loans, it
140
"Romanians are Literally in the Dark," Monterey Penin -
sula Herald (CA), January 23, 1983, p. 5C.
141 Ibid.
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seems likely tht Romania will continue to receive support of
this kind.
D. ECONOMIC DISSENT IN ROMANIA
With the economy in such a low state, and with the recent
example of Polish economic activism (strikes, work slow down,
Solidarity), the potential for economic dissatisfaction to
erupt into open dissent and confrontation with the government
cannot be overlooked. Romania has "the lowest living stan-
dard in Eastern Europe (discounting Albania) despite high
growth rates." 142
Workers' complaints stress inequitable distribution of
resources and inability to find quality consumer goods on
which to spend their rising wages. * 4 3 Workers also resent
the fact that they are asked to defer the realization of ma-
terial values, while there is little, if any, evidence of
sacrifice on the part of the elite. "With its well -stocked
shops, paved streets and modern apartment buildings, this
little village (Scornicesti ) stands out. ..in poverty-stricken
southern Romania. It is the birthplace of the country's pre-
sident and Communist Party leader, Nicolae Ceausescu . "* 44
142
"Goodbye Country Cottage," Economist
,
Volume 267, Num-
ber 7054, November 11, 1978, p. 571
143 Nelson, p. 46.
144
"Romania 's President Runs His Country 'Like a One-Man





Open dissent is a relatively recent phenomenon in Roma-
nia. The first political dissident movement, the first riot,
and the first organized working-class strike all took place
in 1977. These events reflect Romania's transformation into
a more dynamic, heterogeneous society. They could not have
occurred before the introduction of urbanization, mass commu-
nications, and better education, which have led to the devel-
opment of a more highly sophisticated population. Romanians
are becoming less willing to postpone immediate material gra-
tification for a future socialist Utopia. *45
The political dissident movement centered around author
Paul Goma. In a letter to Pavel Kohout and the Czechoslovak
Charter 771*6 dissidents, he declared his support for their
movement. This was followed by the "Letter of the 8," an
open letter to the Belgrade follow-on meeting of the Confer-
ence on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). Signed by
Goma, his wife, and six others, the letter called on Romania
to honor human rights as prescribed in "Basket III" of CSCE's
1975 Final Act in Helsinki. 147
145 Robert L. Farlow, "Romania: The Politics of Autonomy,"
Current History
,
Volume 74, Number 435, April 1978, p. 169.
l^Charter IP was a d i ssl(lent group's declaration detail-
tailing Czechoslovak human rights violations, such as denial
of higher education opportunities to young people because of
their or their parents' political views and the almost total
lack of Constitutionally-guaranteed free public expression.
It was published in Western newspapers in early January 1977.
147 For text of "Basket III," see Appendix D.
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The "Letter" was extremely embarrassing to the Romanian
regime. To deal with the situation, it applied a skillful
combination of concession and coercion. Ceausescu harshly
denounced the dissidents in public, calling them "traitors."
Goma was arrested in April; but in November he was released,
expatriated, and "exiled" to Paris. In May, the government
allowed 142 persons, many of whom had also signed the "Letter
of the 8," to leave for Austria. This combination of intimi-
dation and forced or permitted emigration enabled Romanian
officials to contain the dissident problem, which involved
mainly intellectuals from Bucharest.
The riot occurred in Bucharest in June when a crowd gath-
ered for a concert at the stadium turned into a mob. The si-
tuation began when city officials overbooked the stadium for
the concert. Those unable to get their seats became so in-
censed over the obvious bureaucratic inefficiency that they
stormed the stadium, ripped down political propaganda, and
clashed with police. 148
The strike broke out spontaneously in the Jiu Valley coal
mining region. It began as a protest against revision of the
law regulating pensions. According to the pension law estab-
lished in 1966, pensions were required to "represent 70 to
100 per cent of the tariff wage for the employees in very ar-
duous or very dangerous jobs, 65 per cent up to 95 per cent
l^Farlow, p. 169.
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for those in arduous and dangerous jobs, and 60 per cent up
to 90 per cent for the other labour categories .
*
4 9 The new
law was to apply a more restrictive formula. The strike soon
took on a broader perspective and became a demonstration
against the low standards of living, food shortages, poor
working conditions, unpaid overtime work, reduction in sick-
ness benefits, and poor equipment. Workers in Bucharest,
Braila, and Tirgu-Mures reportedly followed the miners' lead
and engaged in work stoppages.
Massive police and army reinforcements sent to the Jiu
Valley led to confrontations, but the miners would not con-
cede. Entrances to the mines were blocked. Workers closed
and occupied the mining offices for as long as a week. When
Labor Minister Gheorghe Pana and Permanent Bureau member Hie
Verdet arrived to deal with the situation, the miners seized
them and held them hostage.
Summoned from his Black Sea vacation, Ceausescu himself
travelled to the Jiu Valley. Surrounded by armed bodyguards,
he spoke to the strike leaders and an assembly of miners. He
warned the strikers that unless Romania could maintain order
and discipline, it would be trampled underf oot--an obvious
reference to the Soviet Union. He promised investigations of
149Nicolae Ceausescu, Speech Delivered at the Plenary
Meeting of the Central Committee of the Romanian Communist
Party, October 12-14, 1966 (Bucharest: Meridiane Publishing
House, 1966), p. 13.
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working conditions, reform of secondary aspects of the pen-
sion law, reorganization of mines' management, and a five
percent pay raise. Ceausescu also promised the miners there
would be no retribution for their actions. For the moment,
his personal intervention had defused the situation. Shortly
afterward, the miners returned to work.
Later, Ceausescu reneged on his promises. Some of the
strike leaders were fired; others were sent to work in other
mines or on collective farms; wages were docked for nonful-
fillment of production goals. Military police sealed off the
valley, and security police infiltrated among the miners.
The government had managed to contain the incident, but there
was widespread resentment over the crackdown by authorities
and the intimidation of the workers. 150
The most important element that these incidents have in
common is that each was an independent act and addressed is-
sues relevant only to the particular group involved. The
"Letter of the 8" was an intellectual exercise; it said lit-
tle about workers' rights and interests; the riot concerned
only the immediate frustration of the people who had been un-
able to get seats for the concert; the workers' strike con-
cerned issues of safety and workers' pensions, which elicited
little, if any, comment from intellectuals. The Romanian
150J.M. Montias, "Economic Conditions and Political In-
stability in Communist Countries," Studies in Comparative
Communism, Volume 13, Number 4, Winter 1980, p. 294.
112
intellectuals had not yet developed "a 'critical mass' of
open dissidents who might, in the Polish fashion, seek con-
tact with a working class, at least segments of which had
shown a readiness to fight. "151
There is no single, unifying factor between Romanian in-
tellectuals and workers. Unlike the Polish situation, reli-
gion does not provide a common rallying point for dissidents.
Romania's Orthodox Church backs the Ceausescu regime on for-
eign policy and it remains silent on domestic issues. In re-
turn, the regime provides material support to the church. As
part of the relationship, the clergy is required to take an
oath of allegiance to the government. 152
The Romanian constitution officially permits freedom of
religion. The government does not interfere with Orthodox
services or religious gatherings. Consequently, religious
practice is open and wel
1
-attended. However, the government
does try to undermine religious influence. It subtly com-
petes for the "hearts and minds" of Romanian youth by inten-
tionally scheduling mass activities, like rallies or group
outings, on Sundays and religious holidays. 153
!51walter D. Connor, "Dissent in Eastern Europe," Prob -
l ems of Communism, Volume 29, Number 1, January-February,
1980, pp. 10-11.
152 Farlow, p. 169.
153Ri cnar(j[ F. Staar, ed., Yearbook on International Com -
munist Affairs 1982, (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institute Press,
1982), p. 177.
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Approximately 80 percent of the Romanian population is
nominally Romanian Orthodox. The remaining twenty percent
is distributed among various religious denominations: Roman
Catholic, 1.75 million; Calvinist, 1 million; Lutheran,
200,000; Jewish, 50,000; other Protestant sects, less than
1000 each. 154 Some religious dissent has occurred among the
small Protestant sects, but it is not sufficient to disrupt
the relationship between the church and the government. 155
It has not been strident enough to cause much concern.
A more pressing concern for the Romanian government is
criticism of its treatment of the ethnic Hungarian population
in Transylvania. The issue gained international attention in
1978 when Karoly Kiraly, a former high Romanian Communist
Party (RCP) official of Hungarian background, released in the
West several letters that he had sent to the RCP protesting
discrimination against Romania's minorities, especially that
against Hungarians. 15 ^
A similar incident occurred in 1982, when 70 Hungarian
intellectuals appealed to their government to protest Roma-
nian discriminatory practices against ethnic Hungarians. 15 ^
154 Staar, p. 177.
155Minard, p. 177.
156 Staar, p. 72.
157
"Budapest Intellectuals Appeal for Hungarians in Roma-
nia," New York Times, November 23, 1982, p. 4.
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Segments of the Hungarian minority have long perceived them-
selves to be second-class citizens in highly nationalistic
Romania; and with regard to ethnicity, this may be justifia-
ble to some extent. But, with regard to citizenship, Ceau-
sescu "claims everyone--even a large Hungarian minority—as
'Romanians' in a common Romanian homeland regardless of eth-
nic o r i g i n . " 15 8
In 1979, the second dissident group appeared in Romania.
It was a short-lived group known as the Free Trade Union of
Romanian Workers. The rise of this group can be attributed
to the low standard of living and poor working conditions
prevalent at the time. The union claimed support in a number
of working centers throughout Romania. It complained of de
facto unemployment, forced retirement, excessive work norms,
poor wages, and involuntary political activity. 159 j ne gov-
ernment reaction this time was not what it had been in 1977.
This time, the regime moved quickly against the leaders of
the union. Organizers were arrested and sentenced to long
prison terms. The movement appeared to dissipate; however,
the fate of its imprisoned leaders still generates interest
in the West. 160
158E r -j c Bourne, "Education Tax Was Only One of Romanian




159 Nelson, p. 48.
160 Staar, pp. 289-290.
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The number and stridency of sporadic strikes and demon-
strations in Romania in 1981 increased significantly. Two of
the most important incidents occurred in November, once again
in the Jiu Valley. When Ceausescu flew to the scene, as he
had in 1977, his helicopter was stoned. Workers set a police
station on fire in Motru, where they also seized control of
the local Communist Party headquarters. In the process, one
official was killed. 161 i n addition, strikes occurred at the
mines in Leurda, Luporia, and Horasti as well as at the power
station at Rogojelu.*62 j ne situation was finally resolved
when the military police moved in to remove the workers from
the offices they had occupied.
It is interesting to note that the government dealt with
each of these incidents as a single event, none of them con-
nected to any other. The response of the regime to each new
incident of dissent was unique to the situation. The govern-
ment apparently did not perceive these incidents as part of a
general trend toward dissent and dissidence in the country.
Perhaps as a result, very little, if anything, was done to
correct the underlying causes which prompted these eruptions
of popular dissent since 1977.
161"Anti -Ceausescu Demonstrations in Jiu Reported," East
European Foreign Broadcast Information Service
,
Volume 2,
Number 220, November lb, 1981, p. Hi.
162
"Strikes, Demonstrations Reported in Motru," East Eu -
ropean Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Volume 2, Num-
ber 222, November 18, 1981, p. HI.
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E. ECONOMIC REFORM
The rise of dissent in Romania in the late 1970's and
early 1980's is substantial evidence of the need for reform
in the Romanian economy; but the concept of reform is not a
recent development. "Reforms have been initiated in all
countries (of Eastern Europe ) --Romani a ' s first major reforms
were in 1967-68--and have significantly modified the func-
tioning of central ly-pl anned economies . " 16 ^ Al though Romania
tended to be more cautious than Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and
Bulgaria in its reforms, the following tendencies were common
to all Eastern European reform efforts of the late 1960's:
1. The number of compulsory planning index figures,
which are intended to regulate economic activity closely,
were reduced and replaced by a smaller number. Production
was no longer judged in terms of quantity, but of quality.
Profit became the main criterion of management.
2. Enterprises, singly or in a group, were granted a
larger share of the net profit. This sum could be reinvest-
ed, used to finance new techniques, or kept as a bonus for
the staff.
3. Control over investment was given, to some degree, to
the concerns themselves. They could obtain supplementary
credit from banks to make up for the abolition of subsidies.
IG^ark Allen, "The Structure and Reform of the Exchange
and Payments Systems of Some East European Countries," IMF
Staff Papers
,
Volume 23, Number 6, November 1976, p. 724.
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4. The wage policy was revised. Reformers were deter-
mined to combat the long-established tradition of levelling,
which favors skilled and non-skilled manual labor at the ex-
pense of managers, technicians, and research workers. Dif-
ferentiation took place within the companies, the state sim-
ply fixing a minimum wage.
5. Mobility of labor increased; unnecessary work, even
unprofitable enterprises would be eliminated.
6. Prices were revised. Prices of raw materials and ap-
proximately half the consumer goods were fixed by the state;
other consumer goods were allowed fluid prices within pre-
scribed limits; and prices of luxury items and new machines
were decontrolled.
7. State enterprises which manufacture the same products
were urged to compete with one another, to encourage them to
try to improve the quality of their product and reduce price.
Sale of imported goods had a roughly equivalent effect.
8. On the whole, reformers tended to preserve state pre-
rogatives to represent the "universal interests of society,"
to fix the tempo of development, to decide on the main lines
of national and regional development, to determine the dif-
ferentiation between individual salaries, and to determine
the rate of price increases.*^
164p ranco -j s Fejto, A History of the People's Demoncra -
cies, trans. Daniel Weissbort, (New York: Praeger Publish
ersT 1969), pp. 256-257.
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The 1968 reforms of the Romanian economy were intended to
relax some of the organizational constraints on industrial
administration, particularly on lower echelons of the econo-
mic structure. They were also directed toward reduction in
the number of areas under the immediate control of central
planners. A third aim was to provide more scope for the pro-
duction of consumer goods. *"
Another major reform of the Romanian economy was intro-
duced in 1978 with the unveiling of the New Economic Mechan-
ism. When he presented this program to the Grand National
Assembly for approval, Ceausescu described the state of the
Romanian economy as "too centralized, rigid, outdated, and
very complicated." His economic reform proposal sought
to give greater latitude to individual enterprises
to coordinate their activity with the central au-
thorities, who are still charged with drawing up
the central economic plan. Enterprises, however,
will have leeway to: a) devise their own plan and
annual budgets, which must be balanced; b) insti-
tute a profit-sharing system among the workers; and
c) consult with workers (via the workers' councils)
as to the best ways of achieving specified goals.
Enterprises' productivity will be measured on the
basis of net rather than gross output. Production
will now be tied to domestic and foreign contracts. 166
This economic reform package reflected the guidelines and
policies set forth in the 11th Romanian Communist Party (RCP)
16 5Aif red Zauberman, "The East European Economies," Prob -
lems of Communism
,
Volume 27, Number 2, March-April 19/8,
p. 69.
166 Staar, p. 64.
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Congress policy statement of 1975. This statement virtually
gave advance RCP imprimatur to any reform measures the Ceau-
sescu government chose to implement. The following excerpts
from the statement demonstrate what deviations from the basic
socialist model the RCP was prepared to accept:
The conditions of our society imperatively de-
mand the single management of the entire economic
and social activity....
Abiding by the principle of the single-plan
based unitary management there will be continued
actions for the expansion of the autonomy of the
economic and social units in all spheres of acti-
vity; at the same time, it is necessary for devel-
oped autonomy, for incentive from the bottom to be
achieved within the concept of single management....
Economic activity will be focused on the
achievement of production with minimum expenditures;
cost prices should faithfully reflect necessary pro-
duction expenditures, bearing in mind the fact that
the growth and efficiency of production are the de-
cisive factors for increasing the nation's wealth.
Special attention is to be paid to continuously
raising social labor productivity by the mechaniza-
tion, automation and cybernetization of production
processes and economic activities, by the scienti-
fic organization of production and labour....
The production cost will have to ensure an opti-
mum profitableness, reflecting in an adequate way
the policy of enlarged production ... .The stability
of the selling price of consumer goods will be pur-
sued. Retail sales can grow only within the limits
established by the plan according to the policy of
raising the working people's living standard....
Selling prices on the international market will have
to express an even higher turning to good account of
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Although the 1978 reforms went beyond these basic goals,
an even more acute need for reform within the Romanian econo-
my developed since that time. Years of neglect or limited
investment have taken their toll on the agricultural sector.
A shift in emphasis is necessary. President Ceausescu made
this point during a speech before the Second Congress of Man-
agement Councils of Socialist Agricultural Units. While it
is understandable that the delegates to this session would be
receptive to remarks of this type, Ceausescu's remarks were
directed at and publicized to a broader audience as well:
In light of the socialist construction experi-
ence in our country it becomes obvious that the
thesis of priority industrial development to the
detriment of agricultural development and moderniza-
tion was responsible for neglecting the importance
of increasing agricultural production. Application
of that concept brought about disproportions in the
general socio-economic development and had a nega-
tive impact on the people's living standard....
Shortcomings and failings recorded in the past
five-year plan... were mainly due to organizational
shortcomings in the leadership and organization of
the agricultural sectors, to serious manifestations
of bureaucracy in the work of central and local
agricultural bodies, to an exaggerated concentration
of forces on nonproductive activities, to insuffi-
cient supervision of the plan fulfillment and of the
implementation of plan provisions, the law and party
decisions, and to serious deficiency in the distri-
bution of material and human resources . 1^8
Since this speech was made in February 1981, virtually
nothing has been done to improve the condition of agriculture
168"Scinteia Announces Speech to Management Councils of
Agricultural Units," Foreign Broadcast Information Service
,
Volume 2, Number 35, February 23, 1981, p. H.Z.
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in Romania. In fact, investment in agriculture has declined
by three percent since the previous five-year plan.
In January 1981, in response to the staggering effect of
rising oil prices and a deteriorating balance of payments,
the Ceausescu regime implemented still another New Economic
Mechanism. To support the reform effort and pledges to cut
Romanian deficits, the International Monetary Fund approved a
financing arrangement to cover Romanian export shortfalls.
Once again, however, the reform measures proved to be essen-
tially cosmetic, with few substantive effects.
The reforms involved reassignment of producer prices to
approximate more closely world market levels, simplification
of the exchange rate system, adjustment of the domestic ac-
counting system to monitor waste, and adoption of profitabil-
ity for cost control. 169 no effort was made to address the
serious management and planning deficiencies that caused and
perpetuate Romania's economic woes. If the pattern in agri-
culture is typical of how the Romanian government plans to
deal with economic problems, then it is not likely that the
promised structural reforms in the economic system, providing
for more individual initiative, will take place either.^
169Arthur S.
1982, (New York:
Banks, ed., Economic Handbook of the World
McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1982), pp. 434-
170Mark Whitaker and Theodore Stanger, "The Next Basket
Case," Newsweek, Volume 99, Number 15, April 12, 1982, p. 41.
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V. CONCLUSION
Romania's transformation from an agrarian economy to an
industrialized state is a remarkable achievement. What makes
it even more remarkable is the fact that Romania accomplished
this objective after its economy had been devastated by a war
and by a severe exploitation process which literally removed
its economic base.
Despite its tremendous growth over the last three de-
cades, however, Romania still has one of the lowest standards
of living in Europe. Its population has not benefitted in
proportion to the upsurge in economic growth.
This paradoxical situation arises because of the unique
characteristics of the Romanian economy. Romania is a so-
cialist state which adheres to the principles of centralized
planning, collectivization of agriculture, and heavy emphasis
on industrial production, although there have been recent ef-
forts to deemphasize these features. Emphasis on the indus-
trial sector accounted for the rapid growth of the economy.
It also contributed to the low standard of living by sacri-
ficing investment in the consumption sector for greater in-
vestment in industry. Another factor contributing to the low
standard of living is the tendency to sacrifice consumer
goods to the export market. This helps to create a favorable
balance of trade, but creates problems as well.
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Such action reduces goods available for domestic consump-
tion and also causes the economy to be extremely vulnerable
to fluctuations in the world economy. This is what happened
to Romania's economy in the last five-year period. The first
two decades of its existence under Communist rule were good
growth years for the Romanian economy. Rates of growth were
steady and close to 10 percent on the average. But, in the
wake of the oil crisis and resultant world recession, Roma-
nia's economy, so heavily dependent on its trade earnings in
the West, was harder hit than most.
In addition to the effects of the world market on Roma-
nia's economy, the chronically poor management techniques em-
ployed within its centrally-planned economy began to take
their toll in the late 1970's. Previous mistakes were over-
shadowed or excusable in light of the tremendous growth that
was taking place. They were easily lost or forgotten in the
general flurry of activity that occurred in Romania during
the first two decades of its economic development.
When qualitative decisions, rather than quantitative, are
required, the central planning mechanism is ill -equipped to
deal with the situation. As a result, Romania's economy suf-
fered a sudden, precipitous decline.
Besides the purely economic effects, the results of such
poor management lead to dissent and demands for reform. The
Romanian economy has experienced both; but the regime either
chooses to ignore the underlying causes of these disruptive
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features or it simply does not know how or is unwilling to
correct them.
In some ways, Romania is much better off than some of the
other countries of the Eastern European Communist bloc. It
has established a maverick reputation for itself within the
Soviet-bloc and has been a bit more free than the other coun-
tries in pursuing economic ventures, if it so chooses. Its
admission to Western financial organizations in the early
1970's and the special trade agreements that it enjoys with
the United States and many countries of Western Europe attest
to this fact.
But, in other ways, Romania is not as well off as some of
the other countries of the bloc. Because of its maverick ac-
tions, when its policies fail, whether through misfortune or
poor planning, it does not enjoy the support and preferential
treatment of its trading partners within the Soviet-bloc. It
suffers doubly for its independent action.
In addition, because of its conservative attitudes, the
Romanian government has been far more reluctant than some of
the other bloc countries to incorporate structural changes
necessary to correct economic deficiencies. It chooses in-
stead to ignore these underlying causes of its problems and
calls for more sacrifices from the population. Consequently
Romanians have little incentive to support the "reforms" that
are i ntroduced--not like the Hungarians who get tangible ben-
efits from their reform measures--and the economy stagnates.
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There appears to be little that the United States or any
of its allies can do to influence Romania's internal economic
situation at this time. Because Romanian economic growth de-
pends, to a large extent, on foreign trade, its economic dif-
ficulties can be resolved only if the improving world economy
once again begins to absorb Romanian exports. In order for
that to happen, in addition to improvement in the world mar-
ket, Romania will have to produce better quality products.
At the present time, many of its products, even if there were
a market for them, would not be competitive.
Whatever happens within the Romanian economy in the near-
or long-term, the United States and other Western countries
should continue to trade with Romania. Until the end of the
last decade, with the combined effects of the oil crisis and
the worldwide recession, Western trade with Romania was con-
sidered lucrative. This was evident in the rising percentage
of both imports from and exports to Romania from the devel-
oped countries throughout the 1970's. Investment in joint
business ventures also markedly increased during this period.
Until the Polish debt crisis of 1980-81, Romania's abil-
ity and willingness to repay its loans to Western creditors
was never in question. It was only because of shallow com-
parisons between Poland and Romania that Western governments
and banks perceived an increased financial risk in Romanian
trade. These perceptions could become self-fulfilling pro-
phesies as Western reluctance to trade with Romania severely
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limits its ability to obtain the hard currency with which to
repay its debts. The potential financial losses to the West
if Romania reneges on its loan repayment are substantial; but
political implications of Western actions (or inaction) could
far outweigh them.
First, the West would lose opportunities to influence Ro-
manian behavior. It is unrealistic to believe Romania could
break away from the Eastern European bloc or radically modi-
fy its economic structure and procedures. The geopolitical
situation dictates that it remain in the Soviet sphere and a
Communist-dominated socialist state for the foreseeable fu-
ture. Nevertheless, Western actions can force changes in
some Romanian domestic policies. For example, the 1983 U.S.
threat not to renew Romania's most favored nation trade sta-
tus caused the Romanian government to abolish its education
tax for emigration. In addition, it has been argued that Ro-
manian trade with the West permits or at least increases the
scope of its maverick foreign policies.
Second, although its value is difficult to assess, there
is little doubt that Soviet propaganda would exploit a West-
ern financial loss because of Romanian economic setbacks. In
a no-win situation, Western countries could be portrayed as
either easily duped by socialist nations or as exploitative
adventurers not to be trusted in economic situations. The
latter portrayal could have adverse effects in Western deal-
ings with the Third World.
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Third, and most important, lack of Western action to sup-
port Romania economically will drive it, however reluctantly,
closer to the Soviet Union. Romania's energy problems might
lead to popular dissent that could provoke a Soviet military
intervention. Inability to obtain relatively inexpensive
fuel supplies elsewhere may cause the Romanian government to
conclude new deals with the Soviet Union. The "price" of
such deals could include increased Romanian participation in
Warsaw Pact exercises and stationing of Soviet or Pact forces
in Romania. This would increase the military threat to NATO.
Trade with Romania should not be contingent on risks as-
sociated with any other country in the region. It is a mis-
take to categorize all Eastern European countries as a single
entity and treat them all alike. It is an insult to the na-
tional pride of each country, because each has a unique heri-
tage and history. More significantly, it deprives the West
of potentially important points of contact within the Eastern
European Communist bl oc--contacts that could serve as useful
levers for influencing actions in the Communist world. The
fact that trade with the West makes the economies of Romania
and other Soviet-bloc countries stronger benefits them; but,
to the extent that this strength allows them to act somewhat
independently of the Soviet Union, the West benefits too.
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APPENDIX A: TERMINOLOGY OF SOCIALISM
In order to understand the basic model of socialism, it
is essential to have an appreciation for or familiarity with
the definitions of socialist economic terms. Jozef Wilczyn-
ski, an Associate Professor of Economics at the University of
New South Wales, is well-known for his book An Encyclopedic
Dictionary of Marxism, Socialism, and Communism . Educated in
Poland to be an economist, Mr. Wilczynski is uniquely quali-
fied to present the Marxist-Leninist perspective on economic
terms, which differs significantly from that of the market
economies. The following definitions, excerpted from his
most recent book, The Economics of Socialism
,
are thirty
terms used most often in evaluating socialist economies:
Alienation -- estrangement of workers from capital-
ist employers because, although selling their
own labour, they have no control over its use
and over the goods and services they produce.
May also appear under Socialism in the case of
highly centralized economic planning and admin-
istration and a weak or arbitrary system of ma-
terial incentives. It leads to the indifference
or even hostility of workers to enterprises and
of the local management and administration to
higher authorities.
Autarky -- the policy designed to promote self-
sufficiency. This policy was pursued by Social-
ist countries up to about the mid-1 950's, but
since then it has been largely discarded in fa-
vour of the international division of labour.
Bourgeoi s -- pertaining to capitalist societies do-
minated by the bourgeoisie (the social class
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which owns most of the means of production and
hires and exploits the proletariat .
Capital charge -- a continuous levy imposed on so-
ci al i zed (mostly industrial) enterprises in the
form of interest rate, 5-6 p. a., payable to the
state budget. Its purpose is to discourage ex-
cessive possession of capital and its underutil-


















CEMA , CEA, Comecon -- the Council for Mu-
Economi c Ass i stance, established in 1949,
its headquarters in Moscow. Its original
rs are: Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia,
erman D.R., Hungary, Poland, Romania, and
SSR. Albania's membership has lapsed since
whilst Mongolia was admitted in 1962, Cuba
72 and Vietnam in 1978. In addition, kinds
sociate membership were accorded to Yugosla-
n 1966, Finland in 1973, Iraq and Mexico in
and Angola in 1976. (Guyana and Jamaica in-
ed in 1977 and Ethiopia and Mozambique in
that they would also join.) The function of
is to promote economic co-operation and in-
tion among the member nations.
Constant capital -- in the Marxian theory of value
(c + v^ + s_) , that part of capital in the process
o7 production which assumes the form of materi-
alized labour, viz. buildings, machinery, equip-
ment, tools, raw materials, fuel and power and
semi -fi ni shed components. Marx called it con-
stant (£ in the formula) beause its value does
not change in the process of production but is
merely 'transferred* to the output produced (in
contrast to variabl e capital , which is capable
of creating new val ue )
.
Consumer's free choice -- when consumers have freedom
of choice to purchase what is produced for the
consumer market. It implies that the planning
authority determines the size and basic structure
of production for current consumption, but there
1s no rationing. Market equilibrium is ensured
by the authorities manipulating retail prices
(i.e. in practice adjusting turnover taxes) so
that consumption is adapted to production.
Consumers sovereignty -- the condition under which
the consumers ' preferences, expressing them-
selves through spending, ultimately determine
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Absol utethe size and structure of production.
c . s
.
can exist only in market economies. A So-
cial i s t economy can ensure only rational i zed
c . s (i.e. that which is in the interest or so-
ciety), curtailment of anti-social consumption
and a generous provision of social consumption.
Democratic centralism -- the principle (first put
forth by Lenin) of participation and control by
the masses in centralized planning and adminis-
tration.
Extensive growth -- economic growth achieved due to
increases in the amount of the factors of pro-
duction employed (elimination of unemployment,
growth in the labour
capital investment),
ist countries in the
development (roughly
Eastern Europe).
force and an increase in
It is typical of Social -
early stages of economic
up to the mid-1960's in
Horizontal planning -- the system of economic plan-
ni ng under which the central plan is based on
contracts between enterprises enjoying substan-
tial independence. Such contracts, once coordi-
nated and approved by higher authorities, then
become binding targets, the execution of which




rowth -- economic growth attained mainly
increasing labour productivity conse-
quent upon greater specialization, application
of technology and more effective incentives.
Khoraschet -- a Russian term meaning 'cost account-
i n g ' or 'economic accountability'. Enterprises
under this system operate independently of the
State budget for financial resources.
Kol khoz -- a Russian term for 'collective farm',
where land is collectively owned and farmed by
the members.
Matrix of inter-branch balances -- a table consist-
i n g of horizontal rows and vertical columns of
figures showing flows of inputs and outputs of
recipients and producing branches of the econ-
omy in a systematized pattern. It is designed
to ensure the internal consistency of the na-
tional economic plan.
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Means of production -- material factors of produc-
tion, i.e. 1 and and capital (including raw
materials) but excluding labour (and entrepre-
neurship )
.
National income - - or 'Net material product' is the
net (of depreci atiorT] total amount of goods and
productive services produced in a year expressed
at realized prices (not at 'factor cost'). The
national income figure calculated by the Social-
ist method is about one-fifth smaller than if
calculated by the Western method.
Norm -- a rule specifying the amount of working time
indispensable under normal conditions to produce
one unit of an article (alternatively, it can be
expressed as the number of units output to be
produced in a specified period of time).
Objectively determined variations -- a concept used
by L. V. Kantorovich to describe rational prices
arrived at computationally which are conducive
to the fulfillment of the optimal economic plan.
O.d. v. reflect the scarcity of resources (land
and capital , in addition to labour), and thus
they are indicative of opportunity costs on a
macrosocial scale. Their proposed function is
to guide the allocation of resources at the cen-
tral planning level for programming purposes.
Prime cost -- production cost borne by the enter-
prise. It incl udes wages, materials used, inter-
est and depreciation of fixed capital. It does
not include the cost of capital supplied to the
enterprise by the State free of charge or capital
charge.
Procurement price -- prices paid by the State to
col lecti ve and private farms on delivery of farm
products to the State. They are usually differ-
entiated according to a variety of considera-
tions.
Social product -- in Socialist national income ac-
counting, the value of the total output of all
productive enterprises (i.e. 'unproductive ser-
vices' are excluded) in a year. As it includes
final as well as intermediate goods and produc-
tive services, its total is inflated by double
counting.
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Socialization -- expropriation of privately owned
enterprises, farms, agencies, etc., as a rule
without compensation.
Socialized sector -- that which is owned and oper-
ated by society . In consists of State and col-
lectively (or cooperatively) owned enterprises,
farms, agencies, etc. The remaining sector is
'private' (or 'individual').
Socially necessary labour -- the minimum amount of
work performed b~y efficient labour under the
normal technological conditions prevailing in
the economy to produce a particular commodity
or service. It is the determinant of value.






a Russian term for 'Saturday work'.
without pay on a voluntary basis on
or after working hours, usually on
Technical coefficient of production -- a fractional
figure indicating the input-out put relation ap-
plicable to a particular industry or product.
It is calculated by dividing the outlay of input
per unit of output expressed in physical terms
and it can be derived from the matrix of i nter -
branch balances .
Val ue -- the amount of socially n e c e s s a ry labour em-
Bodied in a particular product. The price of the
product, or its actual value-in-exchange, may de-
part from its value according to the conditions








In the formula, it
is the only element contributing
of new value.
the Marxian theory of value
part of total capital in the
which is spent on wages,
is represented by v_, and it
to the creation
Vertical planning -- a system of 'command' planning
in which there is little participation from be-
low. Instead targets and even methods of their
implementation are imposed by directives from
above. It is associated with highly centralized
systems of economic administration and manage-
ment and was typical of Socialist countries up
to about the early 1 960 ' s
.
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These definitions are a small sample of the terminology
used in discussing socialist economic systems. For a more
extensive sampling of terms, see Wilczynski, J(ozef), The
Economics of Socialism
,
(Boston: George Allen and Unwin,
1982)
, pp. xi -xvi i .
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APPENDIX B: ROMANIAN ECONOMIC TABLES
When Romania joined the World Bank in December 1972, very
little information on the structure, organization, and work-
ings of the Romanian economy was known to Western economists.
As is typical of the Communist bloc nations, specific details
and statistical information on the Romanian economy had been
considered national, and therefore closely guarded, secrets.
Since one of the functions of the World Bank is the lend-
ing of money for development in member nations and the sup-
port of economic ventures, it is imperative that the World
Bank understands the inner workings of member nation econo-
mies and has a data base of comparable statistics on each
country. In order to construct such a data base on Romania,
the World Bank sent an economic mission to Romania in 1976
to study its economy and to collect statistical information.
The result of this effort is a decriptive and analytical
work entitled Romania: The Industrialization of an Agrarian
Economy under Socialist Planning (Washington, D.C.: The
World Bank, 1979), by coordinating authors and members of the
mission Andreas C. Tsantis and Roy Pepper. Three tables from
this document--Vol ume of Foreign Trade, Imports by Country of
Origin, and Exports by Country of Desti nation--il 1 ustrate the
changes in Romanian foreign trade through 1976 and highlight
the dramatic growth and shift in emphasis during the 1970's.
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These tables are provided in their entirety, with each of
the following trade categories shown separately: CMEA part-
ners, other socialist countries, developed market economies,
and developing countries. Similarly formatted displays of
import and export statistics since 1976 follow each trade ca-
tegory table. Updates on overall foreign trade volume are
appended to the original statistics.
Data on Romanian trade activity since 1976 are not as
complete as those cited in the World Bank tables; no official
update of the Romanian economic study has yet been performed.
However, available statistics illustrate continuing growth in
both overall trade and extra-Soviet bloc interactions through
1981 in most instances. Available data for 1982 demonstrate
the precipitous drop in Romanian trade that occurred world-
wide. There were two notable exceptions to these trends. In
1981, Canada drastically reduced its trade with Romania when
it cut support to Romania's nuclear power program, and Italy
increaed its volume of imports from Romania in 1982.
Sources for these data are Directorate of Intelligence,
Handbook of Economic Statistics, 1983 , (Washington, D.C.:
Central Intelligence Agency, September, 1983), The Europa
Year Book 1982: A World Survey, Volume I
,
(London: Europa
Publications Limited, 1982), and Bureau of Intelligence and
Research, Trade of NATO Countries with European CEMA Coun -
tries, 1979-1982
,
(Washington, D.C.: Department of State,
November 28, 1983). None of these sources provides 1977
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trade data, but some statistics from 1978 through 1982 are
ci ted.
Some statistics from 1980, final year of the sixth Roma-
nian Five-Year Plan and the last to show across-the-board in-
creases, are noteworthy. Romania's single largest trading
partner was still the Soviet Union, with 17.4 percent of to-
tal trade; the other Eastern European countries accounted for
16.7 percent; the total for all socialist countries was 41.6
percent. Romanian trade with developed market economies rose
to 33.7 percent of total volume; Germany ranked first in this
group at 7.5 percent, and the United States was second at 5.8
percent. Developing countries accounted for 25.6 percent of
Romanian trade, with Iran the largest at 3.9 percent.
Because Romania's currency, the leu (plural, lei), is not
convertible, direct statistical comparisons with Western cur-
rencies are meaningless. To overcome this difficulty, an
economic device called the leu valuta is used for comparison
purposes. The leu valuta is the "foreign exchange leu," used
to express the formal gold price of the leu at any specific
point in time.
The official conversion rate for the leu valuta
,
4.47 lei
per dollar (US), is not used for transactions of any type.
It applies only to official Romanian statistics on foreign
trade and has remained constant since 1978. All trade sta-
tistics in the following tables are derived from official
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APPENDIX C: ECONOMIC PLATES ON ROMANIA
Plate 1
Distribution of Arable Land and Timber Land
Arable Land, Food Industry Area










D = Heavy Industry (i.e., Machine Building)
• = Light Industry (i.e., Textiles)
V = Electric Power (Thermo- or Hydroelectric)
Railways
Developed from map in Tismaneanu, Leonte and Rolica Zaha-
r i a . Present and Prospect in Romania's Social and
Economic Development ^ Translated by Andrei Bantas .












APPENDIX D: THE HELSINKI AGREEMENT
A major factor in the dramatic increase in dissent and
dissidence in Eastern Europe was the ratification and subse-
quent dissemination of the 1975 Conference on Security and
Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) Final Act in Helsinki. Origin-
ally perceived as a diplomatic failure because it legitimized
post-World War II borders in Europe, this document has become
an important contribution to the cause of personal freedom in
Eastern European countries.
Its explicit expression of humanitarian issues, specifi-
cally defined in "Basket III" provisions, enables numerous
groups and individuals in the Communist bloc to protest
openly and to challenge their governments successfully. In-
tellectuals, workers, and minorities in Eastern Europe have
used this agreement to demand changes in emigration require-
ments, relaxation of restrictions on foreign contacts, and
religious freedoms.
An article by Dante B. Fascell, chairman of the CSCE, in
Milton Meltzer's The Human Rights Book
,
(New York: Farrar,
Straus, Giroux, 1979), examines the implications and ramifi-
cations of the Helsinki Final Act. The following text of
"Basket III" appears as an appendix in the book:
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PRINCIPLE VII (guiding relations between Participa -
ting States): Respect for Human Rights and Funda -
mental Freedoms, Including the Freedom of Thought,
Conscience, Religion, or Belief
The Participating States will respect human
rights and fundamental freedoms, including the free-
dom of thought, conscience, religion or belief, for
all without distinction as to race, sex, language or
rel igion .
They will promote and encourage the effective
exercise of civil, political, economic, social, cul-
tural and other rights and freedoms all of which de-
rive from the inherent dignity of the human person
and are essential for his free and full development.
Within this framework, the participating States
will recognize and respect the freedom of the in-
dividual to profess and practise, alone or in com-
munity with others, religion or belief acting in
accordance with the dictates of his own conscience.
The participating States on whose territory na-
tional minorities exist will respect the right of
persons belonging to such minorities to equality be-
fore the law, will afford them the full opportunity
for the actual enjoyment of human rights and funda-
mental freedoms and will, in this manner, protect
their legitimate interests in this sphere.
The participating States recognize the universal
significance of human rights and fundamental free-
doms, respect for which is an essential factor for
the peace, justice and well-being necessary to en-
sure the development of friendly relations and co-
operation among themselves as among all States.
They will constantly respect these rights and
freedoms in their mutual relations and will endeavor
jointly and separately, including in co-operation
with the United Nations, to promote universal and
effective respect for them.
They confirm the right of the individual to know
and act upon his rights and duties in this field.
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In the field of human rights and fundamental
freedoms, the participating States will act in con-
formity with the purposes and principles of the
Charter of the United Nations and with the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights. They will also fulfill
their obligations as set forth in the international
declarations and agreements in this field, including
inter alia the International Covenants on Human
Rights, by which they may be bound.
Co-operation in Humanitarian and Other Fields
The participating States :
Desiring to contribute to the strengthening of
peace and understanding among peoples and to the
spiritual enrichment of the human personality without
distinction as to race, sex, language or religion,
Conscious that increased cultural and educational
exchanges, broader di sseminationn of information,
contacts between people, and the solution of humani-
tarian problems will contribute to the attainment of
these aims,
Determined therefore to co-operate among them-
selves, irrespective of their political, economic
and social systems, in order to create better condi-
tions in the above fields, to develop and strengthen
existing forms of co-operation and to work out new
ways and means appropriate to these aims,
Convi need that this co-operation should take
place in full respect for the principles guiding re-
lations among participating States as set forth in
the relevant document,
Have adopted the following:
1. HUMAN CONTACTS
The participating States :
Considering the development of contacts to be
an important el ement in the strengthening of friendly
relations and trust among peoples,
Af f i rmi ng
, in relation to their present effort
to improve conditions in this area, the importance
they attach to humanitarian considerations,
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Desiring in this spirit to develop, with the
continuance of detente, further efforts to achieve
continuing progress in this field,
And conscio us
"Fe settl ed
that the question relevant hereto
By the States concerned under mutu-must
ally acceptable conditions,
Make it theiraim to facilitate freer movement
and contacts , i n d i v i d u ally and collectively, whether
privately or officially, among persons, institutions
and organizations of the participating States, and
to contribute to the solution of the humanitarian
problems that arise in that connexion,
Declare their readiness to these ends to take
measures which they consider appropriate and to con-
clude agreements or arrangements among themselves,
as may be needed, and
Express their intentions now to proceed to the
implementation of the following:
(a) Contacts and Regular Meetings on the Basis of
Family Ties
In order to promote further development of con-
tacts on the basis of family ties the participating
States will favourably consider applications for
travel with the purpose of allowing persons to enter
or leave their territory temporarily, and on a regu-
lar basis if desired, in order to visit members of
their families.
Applications for temporary visits to meet mem-
bers of their families will be dealt with without
distinction as to the country of origin or destina-
tion: existing requirements for travel documents
and visas will be applied in that spirit. The pre-
paration and issue of such documents and visas will
be effected within reasonable time limits; cases of
urgent necessi ty--such as serious illness or death--
will be given priority treatment. They will take
such steps as may be necessary to ensure that the
fees for official travel documents and visas are
acceptabl e.
They confirm that the presentation of an appli-
cation concerning contacts on the basis of family
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ties will not modify the rights and obligations of
the applicant or of members of his family.
(b) Reunification of Families
The participating States will deal in a positive
and humanitarian spirit with the applications of
persons who wish to be reunited with members of
their family, with special attention being given to
requests of an urgent character--such as requests
submitted by persons who are ill or old.
They will deal with applications
as expeditiously as possible.
in this field
They will lower where necessary the fees charged
in connexion with these applications to ensure that
they are at a moderate level.
Applications for the purpose of family reunifi-
cation which are not granted may be renewed at the
appropriate level and will be reconsidered at reason-
ably short intervals by the authorities of the coun-
try of residence or destination, whichever is
concerned; under such circumstances fees will be
charged only when applications are granted.
Persons whose applications for family reunifi-
cations are granted may bring with them or ship
their household goods and personal effects; to this
end the participating States will use all possibi-
lities provided by existing regulations.
Until members of the same family are reunited
meetings and contacts between them may take place in
accordance with the modalities for contacts on the
basis of family ties.
The participating States will support the ef-
forts of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies con-
cerned with the problems of family reunification.
They confirm that the presentation of an appli-
cation concerning family reunification will not
modify the rights and obligations of the applicant
or of members of his family.
The receiving participating State will take ap-
propriate care with regard to employment for persons
from other participating States who take up permanent
residence in the State in connexion with family
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reunification with its citizens and see that they
are afforded opportunities equal to those enjoyed by




Marriage between Citizens of Different States
The participating States will examine favourably
and on the basis of humanitarian considerations re-
quests for exit or entry permits from persons who
have decided to marry a citizen from another parti
ci pa ting State.
The processing and issuing of the documents re-
quired for the above purposes and for marriage will
be in accordance with the provisions accepted for
family reunification.
In dealing with requests from couples from dif-
ferent participating States, once married, to enable
them and the minor children of their marriage to
transfer their permanent residence to a State in
which either one is normally a resident, the parti-
cipating States will also apply the provisions ac-
cepted for family reunification.
(d) Travel for Personal or Professional Reasons
The participating States intend to facilitate
wider travel by their citizens for personal or pro-
fessional reasons and to this end they intend in
particular:
-- gradually to simplify and to administer flex-
ibly the procedures for exit and entry;
-- to ease regulations concerning movement of
citizens from the other participating States in
their territory, with due regard to security require-
ments .
They will endeavor gradually to lower, where
necessary, the fees for visas and official travel
documents
.
They intend to consider, as necessary, means--
including insofar as appropriate, the conclusion of
multilateral or bilateral consular conventions or
other relevant agreements or understandi ngs--for the
improvement of arrangements to provide consular ser-
vices, including legal and consular assistance.
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They confirm that religious faiths, institutions
and organizations, practising within the constitu-
tional framework of the participating States, and
their representatives can, in the field of their ac-
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